Lawrence Wilkerson Quotes
What I saw was a cabal between the vice president of the United States, Richard Cheney, and the secretary of defense, Donald Rumsfeld, on critical issues that made decisions that the bureaucracy did not know were being made. Now it is paying the consequences of making those decisions in secret, but far more telling to me is America is paying the consequences.
Lawrence Wilkerson, Military Officer and Chief of Staff for Secretary of State Colin Powell, Quoted in Financial Times, October 20, 2005
Sourced by: Eigen's Political and Historical Quotations
Alberto Gonzalez, White House Counsel and later Attorney General who was forced to resign and David S. Addington, Counsel to the Vice President, had come up with a novel view of the powers of the presidency. They argued that since the President is the Commander in Chief, in a war situation or intelligence gathering thereto, has the Constitutional responsibility for that function, he need not obey any laws of Congress as in the conduct of the war Congress would be impinging on the Constitutional separation of powers which itself was prohibited by the Constitution. The argument did not find any significant legal support but for a while the George W. Bush White House behaved as if this were the law, despite the fact that even in the American Revolution and the War of 1812 Congress passed laws regulating the conduct of the armed forces as is provided for in other parts of the Constitution. Yet even Goldsmith would allow the President some powers that many think are unconstitutional and/or belong to Congress. See {32436}.
During the Korean War Secretary of State John Foster Dulles sent instructions to the United Nations Ambassador as to how to vote in a UN debate. Lodge voted to the contrary. The Assistant Secretary of State called to inquire why the instructions were not followed.
MacArthur had been the Commander of our Military Forces in Korea. He had a huge ego, and he wanted to cross the border and attack China since Chinese Troops were aiding the North Vietnamese. He had previously assured the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the President that the Chinese would not send troops into Korea, but he was then wrong. And when they had attacked, they had erased the territorial gains that MacArthur had previously gained. The Joint Chief’s of Staff, the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of State had decided upon a strategy which this time did not follow MacArthur’s strategic advice. The President approved the strategy, but MacArthur spoke and acted contrary. The President met with MacArthur and reiterated the strategy that the President approved. But MacArthur did not follow the orders of the Joint Chiefs. At the time, he and Eisenhower were America’s two most famous military leaders, and of the two MacArthur was senior and thought that he should be President. After he was fired, MacArthur addressed a Joint Session of Congress and gave his "Old Soldiers Never Die" speech which was his first active step towards the Presidency. It was a very sentimental speech with little content and nothing about why he had disobeyed orders. He was totally shocked when it was Eisenhower who was selected to run for President and not him.
Bush assumes that this meant that all the people agreed with his decision to invade Iraq. While that might have been the case, there are other possibilities that many historians, journalists and other analysts have suggested. The Vice President, and his personal staff, were known to have visited them all and lobbied for the invasion. They pressured several of them who may have not wanted to run afoul of what seemed to be the most powerful vice president in American History. Or they may have thought that the decision had already been made, and it was time to join together and loyally support the policy decision that had been made. There were few strong independent thinkers in the top tier as Bush was not intellectually or emotionally inclined to have open staff arguments to work out a policy or very strong advisors with different points of view. The strongest of the advisors like Secretary of State Colin Powell had been lied to and persuaded there was “clear evidence” that Iraq was about to deploy a nuclear weapon. This made Powell an advocate. The intelligence given to Powell and the others was wrong and much was fabricated or obtained from an unreliable source who had been pushed as trustworthy by the Vice President. The CIA Director, had told those all that the evidence and case for the fact that Iraq was developing and close to deploying a nuclear weapon was a “slam dunk”.
That is one view—the one tried the most frequently by Presidents who by their own estimates didn’t get a responsive civil service working to his priorities. Presidents like Teddy Roosevelt, Franklin Roosevelt, and Dwight Eisenhower and Lyndon Johnson had great cooperation from their civil servants; they instead appointed very competent people with strong senses of fairness and leading personnel. Ronald Regan tried both techniques. He used Wilson’s technique in his Education and Justice Department where there was slow-rolling and dissonance when his appointees tended to be ideologues with little or no outstanding professional competence in the fields they supervised. However, his military and State Department bureaucracies was very responsive to his appointees who were excellent leaders.
Periodically in American history, there has been a struggle between the Executive Branch and the Senate for dominance. The Senate’s power is negative however. It can block things, but cannot directly make them happen. The President can do both.
Ford gave the confidential interview under the condition that it would not be made public until after he passed away. It was published by the Washington Post on December 26, 2006 just after Ford died. Ex-President’s are very reluctant to criticize a current President---especially on a foreign policy issue.
Mead argues that this is a trend that has been operating over many administrations. It could be argued that modern communications and the media have been significant drivers of this phenomenon along with the desire for White House staff to have as much control as they can obtain. Before modern communications, an Ambassador, or a Secretary of Commerce had to make decisions within the philosophical and political umbrella of the President’s general policies. They could not communicate immediately with the President or his staff. But once everyone in the government was connected, the President’s staff could make every important decision. However, with the many different major issues and emergencies of the modern era, the small group in the What House have not been able to deal with them all and the bureaucracy has been instructed not to decide big things without going through the White House. See {642086}.
Lawrence B. Wilkerson is a retired United States Army Colonel and former chief of staff to United States Secretary of State Colin Powell. Since the end of his military career, Wilkerson has criticized many aspects of the Iraq War, including his own preparation of Powell's presentation to the UN, as well as other aspects of American policy in the Middle East.