George C. Marshall Quotes
Roosevelt recognized the importance of capturing Berlin both as a political and psychological factor.
The only soldier ever so honored. Marshall was then Chief of Staff of the Army. This quotation is historically very important in that it refutes the accusation made by some FDR and New Deal enemies that Roosevelt was very naïve about the importance of capturing Berlin and ceded control over the invasion and capture of Berlin to Stalin and the Soviet Union. Marshall, one of the most upright of politicians in American history, was not a FDR apologist and few doubted his word or judgment. (Senator Joseph McCarthy and other right wingers however falsely accused him of harboring communists in the Army and working against America’s interest against Russia.
George C. Marshall, 1880-1959, General & U. S. Army Chief of Staff, U. S. Secretary of State, U. S. Secretary of Defense, Nobel Peace Prize Winner Statement to General Albert Wedemeyer, August 25, 1943
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Leval was an appeaser and a collaborator with the Nazi’s. He led the government in name but the Germans really controlled the country. His actions killed tens of thousands of French men and women by turning them over to the Germans. After the Germans were defeated in WWII, Leval was shot as a traitor by the Free French forces.
Many people mistakenly believe that this was the first political use of the “iron curtain” phrase—in German, “eiserner vorhang.” However, George Washington Crile used the phrase in 1915 {598870}. It is not known whether Geobbels knew of Crile’s work, or if Winston Churchill in his famous speech {411311} was familiar with either Crille’s or Goebbels use.
The allies had differences in desirable strategy alternatives. Russia was facing the German Army on its Eastern front and causing huge German casualties but were paying for them in large loss of Russian life—civilian and military (The Russians suffered 22 million deaths as a result of WWII.) Stalin wanted to open a second front in France which would force the Germans to move some divisions from the Russian front, thereby relieving some of the pressure.
Roosevelt had withdrawn his Ambassador to Berlin, publicly reprimanded Joseph P. Kennedy, his Ambassador to England who was pro Fascist and who had said complementary things about Hitler and Mussolini. FDR made anti-German statements to a degree unknown for a country not at war. Hitler publically stated that the Germans would not be pressured. Dictators who U. S. leaders have tried to isolate and pressure, have made similar statements ever since. The American intervention was certainly effective against Hitler.
Both Hitler and Stalin were gross egomaniacs who each thought that they had gotten the better of things. The result was that 22 million Russians were killed and the industrial base if Russia Was destroyed. On the German side, the German military was virtually destroyed, many civilians were killed, the nation reduced to rubble and starvation, German leaders were killed, jailed or committed suicide including Hitler, and the country was occupied for years. Neither leader appeared very smart if one judges by the results.
The then Attorney General had established a back channel to the Russian agent. There was genuine fear by the Russians and some in America that there were still many Nazis and German nationalists who would try and influence, if not take over, German politics to produce another aggressive German fascist state. The Russians had lost 22 million citizens to the Germans in the war and had faced a defeated Germany where virtually every German over the age of 30 had been cheering for and supporting Hitler a decade ago. Neither the Russians nor we and the other allies had not yet seen the remarkable turn-around that the German nation would make and the intense anti-fascist, non-military ethos that would be brought by the younger German generations. The direction of Germany was then very unpredictable.
The Russians had lost over 20 million of its people to German WWII hostilities. They wanted a vengeance and were willing to take the casualties that came with the invasion of Berlin and many other key cities that were heavily defended. Eisenhower and Churchill realized that this would give the Russians a very dominant military occupation of Eastern Europe and Eastern Germany. However, they did not want to take the huge casualties of all these battles. Politically, Churchill and American leaders had to explain to their right wings why Russia was involved as an equal partner in making occupation decisions about Germany.
The Germans killed 22 million Russians, most deliberate murders and not collateral damage, in WWII.
Hopkins was a social worker with no military of political experience. But the President trusted him implicitly. Most American military officers and Ambassador to England Joseph P. Kennedy, a Nazi sympathizer & father of JFK, believed that England could not stand up to Hitler. Any military aid we gave England would fall into the hands of the Germans. Everyone was shocked when Roosevelt sent Hopkins to England to make a military recommendation. To impress Hopkins with something he thought Hopkins would be interested in, Churchill led a tour of workers cottages built by the government. Hopkins surprised Churchill and his aids who would never forget this statement & then asked to see the military facilities. Hopkins distressed the American military by recommending that Britain could hold out against invasion if they received military aid. Despite the contrary military advice, FDR accepted Hopkins’ recommendations, and the rest is history. He had been right and much of the military wrong.
George Catlett Marshall Jr. was an American soldier and statesman. He rose through the United States Army to become Chief of Staff under presidents Franklin D. Roosevelt and Harry S. Truman, then served as Secretary of State and Secretary of Defense under Truman. Winston Churchill lauded Marshall as the "organizer of victory" for his leadership of the Allied victory in World War II. After the war, he spent a frustrating year trying and failing to avoid the impending civil war in China. As Secretary of State, Marshall advocated a U.S. economic and political commitment to post-war European recovery, including the Marshall Plan that bore his name. In recognition of this work, he was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 1953.