Eric Le Boucher Quotes
The gap is widening between France’s proud diplomatic rhetoric and the nation’s ability to translate words into action.
Eric Le Boucher, French Columnist, “Les New Miserables,” Foreign Policy, January/February 2004
Sourced by: Eigen's Political and Historical Quotations
This is another example of how President Roosevelt conducted his own international diplomacy independent of his own State Department. At the time, the U. S. State Department would not have any contact with Nehru who was in and out of British Indian jails for his anti-Colonial agitating. Roosevelt, however was a great admirer of Nehru and the Congress party and the commitment to democracy, freedom of religion, speech and the press and civil rights. Roosevelt and the American military strategic leaders were beginning to worry that China, even with help, would not be able to hold off the Japanese aggression, and India would become a frontier for the Allied war effort. The President realized that Nehru and his Congress Party were pressuring England for independence and extreme Indian nationalists were advocating non-support of the British military effort and strikes and protests to bog down the British army dealing with them instead of fighting the Japanese in Burma and elsewhere. There were a large number of Indian Brigades fighting for the British and if the Indian military volunteers were to be discouraged or boycotted, the allied war effort would suffer. So the President's style was to personally see what he could contribute over and above (and often to the distress of) his agencies established to do the job.
The French had arrived there first an “claimed” the area with a tiny military contingent under Lieutenant Marchand. However, the British arrived afterward with a much larger military force. London and Paris decided that the French should withdraw in favor of the British. Delcasse had been right. Another case of “might makes right.”
Baratier wanted to defend Fashoda at all costs as a matter of French honor. The Minister was trying to broaden his understanding of French honor and avoid a military defeat. A diplomatic solution was found that preserved everyone’s honor.
The great European powers were attending an International Congress—Summit Meeting of the heads of government and their diplomats to deal with the crisis of Tsarist Russian military expansionism. None of the other European powers of the time wanted or could afford war so Russia could only be thwarted by Great Britain. There were many in England who thought that the British should not even attend and should send troops immediately. The Queen and the Royal Family were among those. At the Congress Disraeli, who had much personal affection for Queen Victoria, wanted to reassure her. 1st Earl of Beaconsfield. If the Congress did not succeed the mainland of Europe would have been at war. Disraeli obtained everything England wanted. See Russian Ambassador Prince Gortchakoff’s observation.
The Israeli Foreign Minister conveyed to the President the suggestion of French President De Gaulle that the "Four Great Powers" ought to get together:
FDR had agreed to send destroyers to help Churchill but to placate Congress he wanted a formal agreement for Britain to lease bases to the United States. Roosevelt wanted the Prime Minister to work out a Lend Lease agreement with the Attorney General. Jackson’s reply was “But Republics do!”
After the U.S. Ambassadors to Chile refused to deliver a demarche {610338} to the Chilean dictator Augusto Pinochet on U.S. objections to a proposed assassination, the State Department decided not to act and as a result the former Chilean foreign minister, Orlando Letelier and his American assistant were murdered in Washington DC the next morning. This incident became known as the Condor scheme. Incredibly, for years the State Department covered up the fact that they had advance knowledge of a murder that was committed in the United States and did not act. Pinochet, many years later was tried for his many crimes.
The importance of plausible deniability was as important to statecraft in the 18th century as it is today.