Tatyana Kudryavtseva Quotes
This was discussed many times at different levels, and the problem was that it was a prince, a member of the imperial family. If it had been a Prime Minister, it would have been different. Our attitude toward empires was you know what. Absolutely negative. We did not know who could meet him because Stalin could not meet with him.
In 1945 a message was sent to Joseph Stalin from the Japanese purportedly authorized by the Emperor asking the Russians to receive a peace envoy to discuss possible terms for a Japanese surrender. A prince of the imperial household was proposed as the emissary. The allies had already agreed and announced that unconditional surrender was the only alternative, but Stalin and the Russian Foreign Office thought that there might be some advantage gained to have the meeting. However there was one problem that the Japanese had never considered. When Stalin told Truman of the initiative, Truman agreed that no one should meet him.
Tatyana Kudryavtseva, Staff Assistant to the Russian Foreign Minister, Interview, The History Channel, Hiroshima: The Decision to Drop the Bomb, September 14, 2003
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The great European powers were attending an International Congress—Summit Meeting of the heads of government and their diplomats to deal with the crisis of Tsarist Russian military expansionism. None of the other European powers of the time wanted or could afford war so Russia could only be thwarted by Great Britain. There were many in England who thought that the British should not even attend and should send troops immediately. The Queen and the Royal Family were among those. At the Congress Disraeli, who had much personal affection for Queen Victoria, wanted to reassure her. 1st Earl of Beaconsfield. If the Congress did not succeed the mainland of Europe would have been at war. Disraeli obtained everything England wanted. See Russian Ambassador Prince Gortchakoff’s observation.
In the earliest prediction of the World War II conflict between America and Japan:
The final decision regarding the attack on Pearl Harbor and war with America had to be made. The Emperor Hirohito, Prime Minister Tojo, the full cabinet and leading elder statesmen were invited. Hara attended as one of the latter class. America had instituted an embargo of critical raw material whose end was contingent of Japan withdrawing from the territory that they had invaded and stop their territorial aggression in Asia, an aggression which some Japanese leaders—notably the military—was absolutely necessary to provide for the growing Japanese population and its increasing standard of living. At the time, an embargo was a powerfully effective weapon, which left Japan only two choices: Withdrawal or War. In modern times nations have chosen to endure and evade embargoes rather than be forced into undesirable positions.
This is the quotation that came to define Chamberlain’s naivety for history and the icon of failed diplomacy. However to see the beginning of the sequence of events that would lead up to this statement, see {585940} when Chamberlain suggested the infamous meeting in Munich. There had been an interesting history to Chamberlain’s appeasement of Germany. 39 years earlier, Chamberlain’s father, then Britain’s Colonial Secretary, and advocated a natural alliance with Germany. See Joseph Chamberlain, 1836-1914: {585939}.
The Germans had invaded Russia who despite losing over 20 million people continued to fight the Germans who had never had to deploy forces over such a large territory. But it was the severe Russian Winter that turned the tide. Germans were not equipped or dressed for the terrible winter. The Russians were used to it. The Germans were repulsed and had to retreat back into Germany.
Chamberlain’s policy was to appease Hitler and Germany to avoid war. Although he did not see Czechoslavkia as a critical British national interest and claimed he had secured peace {585941} , the reality was that he gave Germany room to start its aggression which would engulf all of Europe and much of the world. The British became the only bulwark against Hitler until the Russians stopped the Germans and America entered the war.
The Conclusion of the Russo-Japanese War. The treaty was negotiated and signed in Portsmouth New Hampshire. President Theodore Roosevelt was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize for his mediating efforts. The language was typical of a peace treaty where just before its signature the two nations and their emperors were vilifying and dehumanizing the other.
Prior to this the Japanese had not even considered what terms they might fight for if there were to be a peace negotiation. What the Japanese leadership apparently totally missed was the fact that President Roosevelt and all other American leaders throughout the war had promised that only unconditional surrender would be acceptable. This was reiterated in a Joint Declaration of the U. S. , China, and Great Britain. The Japanese thought this just propaganda and never took it seriously.
She and her husband, like many of the "America Firsters", believed that Hitler should be allowed to overrun Europe and Russia.
In the 1920s and 1930s China was in chaos. Chiang Kai-shek and his Nationalists were officially the government but there was extensive corruption and local “leaders” who fought for control of territories and resources. Chinese were slaughtering each other daily not unlike Bosnia in the 1990s. The Japanese had moved into Manchuria using the pretext that they were saving China by bringing order and security. (In reality they were trying to control additional territory to populate with their rapidly expanding population.) The U.S. opposed the Japanese aggression but privately warned the Chinese Nationalists that they had better get control of the nation. The Nationalists never did. The Japanese expanded into much more of China beginning WWII in Asia. The Nationalists and the communists joined forces to fight the Japanese and after the war, the communists won the allegiance of most of the people. The Chinese government was finally unified, but under the communists.
This was the 14th part of the Japanese reply to a previously made American peace proposal. The Japanese policy was to unite all of Asia into a co-prosperity sphere controlled by Japan where Japan would militarily conquer those Asian countries which did not “voluntarily” want to join. The Japanese were in the process of conquering China and the United States and Britain had embargoed oil and other material to Japan trying to pressure them to withdraw their troops from China and cease Japanese conquest by force. Japan believed that it was their right to conquer and control Asia and it was beneficial to the region, and that the U. S. and Britain had no right to curtail the expansion that Japan required to assure raw materials and other necessities. At the very time that these negotiations were on going, the Japanese fleet was sailing for the sneak attack on Pearl Harbor. The attack took place the very day this part of the Japanese reply was received.
His appeal was also in the name of concurring heads of state of Finland, Holland, Denmark, Norway, Luxemburg, and Sweden.
His appeal was also in the name of concurring heads of state of Finland, Holland, Denmark, Norway, Luxemburg, and Sweden.