Henry A. Kissinger Quotes

The conventional army loses if it does not win. The guerilla wins if he does not lose.

Irregular war is far more intellectual than a bayonet charge.

You can't talk about defeating insurgencies in the same way that you can with a conventional army.

Vietnam was as much a laboratory experiment as a war.

This is a totally different war than any we've ever fought before.

Time and again, attempts by machine-age armies to impose their will on irregular forces supported by a sympathetic population failed.

The United States Army had become reliant on firepower and technological superiority in its history of annihilating enemy forces...The concept that success in counterinsurgency consisted of separating the insurgents from popular support never took hold. The U.S. Army proceeded with its historical role of destroying the enemy army –p even if it had a hard time finding it.

We fought a military war; our opponents fought a political one… The North Vietnamese used their armed forces the way a bull-fighter uses his cape — to keep us lunging in areas of marginal political importance.

It is permitted to surprise the infidels under cover of night, to bombard them with catapults and to attack them without declaring war.

The United States, acting within the constraints imposed by its traditions and public attitudes, cannot crush a revolutionary movement which is sufficiently large, dedicated, competent and well supported…. The structure of U. S. military power is ill-suited to cope with guerrilla warfare waged by a determined, resourceful, and politically astute opponent.

George Washington hated the guerrillas. He wanted to imitate the British red coat armies, fighting as gentlemen are supposed to fight.

This war differs from other wars, in this particular. We are not fighting armies but a hostile people, and must make old and young, rich and poor, feel the hard hand of war.

Guerrilla war is a kind of war waged by the few but dependent on the support of many.

Guerrilla wars, and even more so terrorist assaults, are conducted only by forces with insufficient strength to carry out a real war.

Thus it is that in war the victorious strategist only seeks battle after the victory has been won, whereas he who is destined to defeat first fights and afterwards looks for victory.

Some of the generals are saying, 'We're making progress. We are clearing an area.' But you really don't defeat the Taliban by clearing an area. They move.

With an insurgency, people are the prize. We can win every battle and still lose the war.

An insurgency is the most difficult to fight of all military activities.

We cannot afford to be idle, and though weaker than our opponents in men and military equipments, must endeavor to harass if we cannot destroy them.

A government needs 100 soldiers for every guerilla it faces.

Guerrilla troops, especially when supported by much of the population, [can] hold a colonial army at bay.

Guerrilla warfare is essentially a political war.

Counter insurgency is something we can’t do, can’t do well, and shouldn’t be doing.

While the war is by no means over, my Soviet or Chinese counterpart's report must exhibit great concern over the Viet Cong's mounting problems and the steady improvement in the ability of both the South Vietnamese and the Americans to fight a people's war.

The insurgent can sow disorder anywhere, whereas the counterinsurgent—fighting on behalf of the government—has to maintain order everywhere.