Charles Owen Prince III Quotes
When the music stops, in terms of liquidity, things will be complicated. But as long as the music is playing, you’ve got to get up and dance. We’re still dancing.
The Meltdown of 2008 came a year later and Citigroup, one of the largest banks in America, had massive liquidity problems and in order to stave off bankruptcy the taxpayers had to come up with $45 Billion. The bank executives, as this quotation demonstrates, knew that they were in a very risky situation and that if the subprime mortgages started to default, the “music would stop” and they and the other banks would have a massive liquidity problem. None the less, they kept on investing more and more of their bank customer’s money and making money in what they knew was a highly risky enterprise. The greed clouded their judgment and when the music stopped and many were no longer dancing, the Meltdown of 2008 almost destroyed the entire national economy and triggered the Great Recession where the overwhelming proportion of Americans had to suffer for the greed of those who could not “stop dancing” even as they knew it was very dangerous.
Charles Owen Prince III, Chairman & CEO, Citigroup, Explaining why the bank was still investing in highly risky and questionable derivatives based on troubled mortgages, July 2007
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U. S. Treasury Secretary Larry Summers called Rajan a “Luddite” for this view, but what Rajan observed and predicted was exactly what happened in the Meltdown of 2008 which led to the Great Recession. Rajan was one of the few economists to call this right. Several, invested their own money assuming a crash and made billions. Most, like Summers and the Federal Reserve Chairmen in retrospect admitted that they missed the signs and didn’t connect the dots. See {637168}, {637987}, and {620038}
Born thought that her agency was responsible for regulating the new esoteric financial products—derivatives including credit default swaps—for otherwise there would be no regulation at all of financial products that could dwarf the stock and bond market. Summers persuaded her to back off. When the Meltdown of 2008 hit, the huge derivative exposure of the large banks and some insurance companies was so great that it was one of the major causes for the meltdown of the entire banking system. Summers, normally a great economist not only called this one wrong, but later, along with most other government and private economists ignored a very explicit warning—See {637168}, {637986}, and {620038}.
Credit default swaps were in large part responsible for the melt down of the economy of 2008 and the Great Recession thereafter. A credit default swap was one of the favorite derivatives that became popular. Is an insurance policy that a company will pay off its bonds and not go bankrupt. It is a cross between an insurance mechanism and a stock exchange type security mechanism, and through heavy lobbying, escaped any kind of regulation. It cost a company no money to write a credit default swap, and they were paid to do so. As long as business and the economy was good, it was a terrific business but there was no way of ever knowing how much risk they were taking. So companies who wrote credit default swaps did not have to have the money to pay to back them up. When that happened in 2008, even the largest insurance company in the world collapsed because of the risk of having to pay the credit default swap and the U. S. Government had to take over the insurance company. In 2010, the Obama administration passed a financial reform bill that began to regulate credit default swaps. Buffet, the American who had made the most money in financial securities, realized the great danger not only to the company, but to the entire national economy. Most of the rest of the financial institutions, could make large amounts of money without have to have much capital as long as things went well. So credit default swaps began to exceed the other financial instruments in activity. Neither the Federal Reserve or the other government regulatory agencies chose to regulate these risky instruments nor even to require that they be publicly disclosed -- See {637987}, {637986} and {637992}.
This warning was a decade before the Meltdown of 2008, but was not heeded by any of the politicians. As a result a number of the companies that made all those risky decisions assumed that if something went terribly wrong the government would not let them fail. Unfortunately, they were right and the taxpayers spent billions to prevent companies from failing. After the meltdown all the politicians vowed to end the too big to fail concept, but while some improvements were made, the Congress could not come to agreement, and the markets and a number of companies think that they are still too big to fail. This is particularly true for Defense Contractors where the government has and probably will in the future, protect irresponsible companies from failure if they are the only company that makes needed weapons and other equipment.
The savings and loan crises became clear shortly thereafter.
The Meltdown of 2008 and Great Recession that it caused
He was referring to Fannie Mae, the government-created. private mortage guarantee company. It was heavily regulated, and in general it met the regulatory requirements. However, the requirements were insufficient, and in the 2008 Meltdown and the Great Recession that followed, Fannie Mae itself was in such bad financial condition, that the Federal Government had bail them out or have the entire home mortgage industry fall apart.
This was yet another warning about an area that became a major factor 4 years later in the Meltdown of 2008 and the Great Recession. The George W. Bush administration, however, rejected proposals to prevent more mortgage abuses by regulating the banks and mortgage brokerage industry more.
He was replying to Senator Grassley--{637990}. This quotation is one of the saddest admissions in American law enforcement and corporate regulatory history. A small group of very wealthy men, working for huge financial corporations caused the worst financial crisis since the Great Depression. The Government regulators were reined in by the Bush Presidential administration and were none to competent anyway. The Clinton Administration repealed the Glass Stiegel Act allowing banks to gamble with customer’s The Congress made matters worse by kowtowing to the housing and real estate special interests and overheating the housing market. But with all that some of the many of the financial executives committed crimes ranging from financial fraud to forgery of court documents. But they had put the country into such a poor economic state, that the Obama administration feared that prosecution of some of the leading financial executive criminals would spook the financial markets and cause an even greater economic situation. At least the Attorney General admitted the truth of Senator Grassley’s suspicion--{637990}.
Greenspan accepted this as many other economists and financial regulators did. What they did not take into account was the incredible greed of many of the financial executive who were betting with their customers money, If the bet was right they, the shareholders and the customers all made out very well as they were highly leveraged. If the bet was wrong, the shareholders and customers lost a lot, and the financial executives only made their multimillion dollar salaries and bonuses (Many were actually were guaranteed their bonuses even if they put the company into bankruptcy.) Worse, they earned their money when they made their sales or earnings targets, but when the securities they bought went sour, even if the company had no funds left, the. It was “heads we all win and tails only I win.” The vested interests between the financial company executives, the shareholders, and the clients were divergent, and the customer was at the bottom of the money pole.