J. Reuben Clark Quotes


The world has gone back a half a millennium in its conduct of international relations in time of war…. no nation has to bear a greater blame for this than our own ….As for Hiroshima and Nagasaki, some of us think it was shameful. Are we Christians? We act like pagans.


Context

Although generally a right wing conservative, Clark today sounds like almost like an extreme leftist on the issue. At the time however, many thought that he had taken leave of his senses. He not only was completely contrary to bipartisan national policy but opposed by almost universal American public opinion. He is one of the very few significant American officials to oppose the war policies.


Citations

J. Reuben Clark, 1871–1961, U. S. Ambassador to Mexico, Referring to the WWII bombing of cities and the use of the atomic bomb, Quoted in Hickman and Hilliam, “J. Reuben Clark”

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Truman had just told Stalin about the new technology. Stalin had actually already known something about it as the result of Soviet espionage in the United States.


On March 9-10, 1945, over three hundred B-29 Superfortresses loaded with 2,000 tons of incendiary bombs flew over Tokyo bombing the city in waves for 6 hours. Over 250,000 buildings were destroyed and more people were killed than would be in either Hiroshima or Nagasaki which were destroyed by atomic bombs. See {615730} and {615733}. The technique called area bombing was then implemented on Japanese cities 66 more times. Stimson was seriously worried that there would be no large targets in Japan left on which the dramatic effect of the atomic bomb could be demonstrated. And without such a demonstration, there would not be a likely Japanese surrender as all the devastating conventional bombing had not persuaded the Japanese. A land invasion with perhaps millions of casualties might be required.


On March 9-10, 1945, over three hundred B-29 Superfortresses, loaded with 2,000 tons of incendiary bombs flew over Tokyo bombing the city in waves for 6 hours. Over 250,000 buildings were destroyed and more people killed than would be in either Hiroshima or Nagasaki which were destroyed by atomic bombs. The fact that the Japanese would not surrender even after such complete destruction of their capital and largest industrial city, was used by American leaders in assessing whether to use the atomic bomb afterwards. There were many who believed that the atomic bomb would not be enough for motivate a Japanese surrender as Japanese culture prohibited surrender. Indeed, even after the 1st atomoc bomb, the Japanese did not surrender, and after the 2nd, the war council was split 3-3 and the Emperor historically broke the tie. Even the atomic bomb might not have worked. Later generations found this resistance to surrender hard to understand but Japanese culture was amazingly strong then.


A few Americans who were too young to remember WWII hav in retrospect questioned the use of the Atomic Bomb against Japan. Young Japanese feel even stronger on this point. This quotation is very important because it comes for a senior Japanese official who knew the conditions at the time.


There were some doubts the scientists developed after Germany had surrendered as Hitler had been their greatest fear. So they were briefed on the planned invasion of the Japanese mainland and the military medical preparations for treating and caring for ½ million serious wounded casualties. In addition, given the state of war, there was expected about the same number of American Military deaths. On top of that, there would be many more Japanese military casualties plus even more Japanese civilian deaths and wounded. The use of the Atom Bomb would save all those lives but have casualties of its own, but far fewer. At the time, surprising to most people now, the use of the atomic bomb was not an issue of controversy at all. There were no Congressman who questioned it, no newspapers which editorialized against the use of the bomb. There were not even any other counties which protested its use.


Truman had been briefed on the number of Japanese who committed suicide rather than surrender—including civilians—in Saipan, Okinawa, Iwo Jima, and other locations where United States troops had invaded. He and his experts agreed that the Japanese would not surrender unless there was a new dramatic factor that was outside the usual thinking—the atomic bomb. He was proved right about the warning. Not only did the Japanese ignore it, but they did not even surrender after the nuclear devastation at Hiroshima. It took a second bomb dropped on Nagasaki to motivate the surrender. So even a demonstration with all those Japanese casualties did not cause the surrender until it was repeated.


Bombing had reached the point where conventional bombing raids on industrial cities like Tokyo and Hamburg produced even more civilian casualties than did the atomic bomb at Hiroshima. Tibbets’ view, through the lens of hindsight, was developed by many of the Allied servicemen who had been forced into war by expansionist and militaristic nations like Japan and Germany both of which placed much of their war material manufacturing capability in the midst of their otherwise civilian cities. Both brutally violated the laws of war and committed atrocities many times over before the allies began retaliating. There are still some who believe that it was wrong to drop the atomic bomb on Japan. Some even feel that the mass bombing of Japanese and German cities in retaliation and in furtherance of the war effort was morally wrong. But at the time, the millions of casualties anticipated in the invasion of the Japanese mainland, persuaded virtually every American soldier and civilian that there was nothing wrong with use of the Atomic bomb, and many saw it as an absolute Godsend to prevent all the American and Japanese causalities that would have come otherwise. Many scholars remark on how it was virtually impossible to find any significant number of misgivings before or just after Hiroshima. Tibbet’s view was typical.


The note was found in an abandoned Japanese camp on Bataan. There are some who believe that this note was a forgery. However, most think it genuine as it reflected one of the Japanese
“aces in the hole” to defend against an allied invasion of the Japanese mainland. It was one of the reasons that some American planners advocated use of the Atomic Bomb. Of course that was a real risk of using the bomb. The Japanese might be so angry and feel morally abused and kill the many allied prisoners they had. Many thought it was a lesser risk because it did not have the symbolic animus that foreigners occupying the Japanese homeland had. The quotation illustrates the amazing complexity that the American and allied leadership faced trying to end WWII in the Pacific.


The Scientific Project that developed the Atomic Bomb. The focus of the scientists had been to beat the German’s who were terribly evil might develop a bomb first. After the defeat of some scientists began to have concerns about their purpose. Most were very distrustful of the army and believed little of what they were told, by the military at Los Alamos. However, in a remarkable our de force of leadership, Oppenheimer had the trust of virtually all of the staff. This memo and a briefing of the invasion plans of mainland Japan (see {629858} ) convinced the scientist to maintain their intense and punishing pace.


The Scientific Project that developed the Atomic Bomb. Hundreds of thousands of American troops were on their way to join the invasion of Japan where there were huge American casualties expected when the two atom bomb drops ended the war. At the time, surprising to most people now, the use of the atomic bomb was not an issue of controversy at all. There were no Congressman who questioned it, no newspapers which editorialized against the use of the bomb. There were not even any other counties which protested its use. The blessing of ending the war, even at the cost of less than 200,000 deaths seemed a clearly desirable tradeoff when compared with the many millions of deaths that would have occurred had the bomb not been used. As an example, the conventional bombing of Tokyo before the nuclear weapons were used killed as many Japanese as either Hiroshima or Nagasaki.


J. Reuben Clark
J. Reuben Clark
  • Born: September 1, 1871
  • Died: October 6, 1961
  • Nationality: American
  • Profession: Clergyman

Joshua Reuben Clark Jr. was an American attorney, civil servant, and a prominent leader in The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (LDS Church). Born in Grantsville, Utah Territory, Clark was a prominent attorney in the Department of State, and Undersecretary of State for U.S. President Calvin Coolidge. In 1930, Clark was appointed United States Ambassador to Mexico.