Robert E. Litan Quotes
One of the most important causes of economic crises is “running liabilities”, or short term debt that the government does not insure. The U. S. financial sector holds trillions of dollars of such debt, including uninsured bank deposits and the short-term liabilities of other financial institutions, such as overnight loans…. Amongst the potential causes of the next crisis, the massive amount of short-term debt ranks as the most probable.
[Most Americans do not realize that not wall bank deposits are insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC). That insurance covers only a basic amount ($250,000 at the time of the quotation was written, but nothing over the basic amount. There is no federal insurance for all the stock brokerage accounts. There is private insurance that will generally protect against the failure of a particular brokerage company failure, but that would not help in an industry wide failure]
Robert E. Litan, “America’s Brewing Debt Crisis”, Foreign Affairs, September / October 2016
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Credit default swaps were in large part responsible for the melt down of the economy of 2008 and the Great Recession thereafter. A credit default swap was one of the favorite derivatives that became popular. Is an insurance policy that a company will pay off its bonds and not go bankrupt. It is a cross between an insurance mechanism and a stock exchange type security mechanism, and through heavy lobbying, escaped any kind of regulation. It cost a company no money to write a credit default swap, and they were paid to do so. As long as business and the economy was good, it was a terrific business but there was no way of ever knowing how much risk they were taking. So companies who wrote credit default swaps did not have to have the money to pay to back them up. When that happened in 2008, even the largest insurance company in the world collapsed because of the risk of having to pay the credit default swap and the U. S. Government had to take over the insurance company. In 2010, the Obama administration passed a financial reform bill that began to regulate credit default swaps. Buffet, the American who had made the most money in financial securities, realized the great danger not only to the company, but to the entire national economy. Most of the rest of the financial institutions, could make large amounts of money without have to have much capital as long as things went well. So credit default swaps began to exceed the other financial instruments in activity. Neither the Federal Reserve or the other government regulatory agencies chose to regulate these risky instruments nor even to require that they be publicly disclosed -- See {637987}, {637986} and {637992}.
U. S. Treasury Secretary Larry Summers called Rajan a “Luddite” for this view, but what Rajan observed and predicted was exactly what happened in the Meltdown of 2008 which led to the Great Recession. Rajan was one of the few economists to call this right. Several, invested their own money assuming a crash and made billions. Most, like Summers and the Federal Reserve Chairmen in retrospect admitted that they missed the signs and didn’t connect the dots. See {637168}, {637987}, and {620038}
The Treasure Officials had a reason for bailing out the bondholders. They were afraid that if bank bondholders and owners took big losses at that time, it would “spook” the financial markets and cause even worse panics than then existed. The political pressure would be to bail out the financial institutions which would have lost much more money after the “spooking”. So it was, they argued, less cost to the taxpayer to bail out the bondholders at the beginning and save the bailout costs later. Some argued that there was no reason to bail out the richest people in America if they lose a lot of money so it is not an issue of bail out now or later. History shoed that the financial leaders did have the clout to force the government to bail them out however. There are some who wanted to have a showdown with the wealth banks and other financial institutions and let them go bankrupt and then the economy would right itself. No one really knows for sure which is why Economics is called the “dismal science”—See {596873}.
Banks often lie. The system encourages them to do so. In a crisis, if a bank honestly says that it is not sure that it has enough cash and other liquid assets, others will not lend it any more money and depositors will rush to withdraw their money, thereby almost insuring a failure. The bank that lies, might weather the storm and survive.
Born thought that her agency was responsible for regulating the new esoteric financial products—derivatives including credit default swaps—for otherwise there would be no regulation at all of financial products that could dwarf the stock and bond market. Summers persuaded her to back off. When the Meltdown of 2008 hit, the huge derivative exposure of the large banks and some insurance companies was so great that it was one of the major causes for the meltdown of the entire banking system. Summers, normally a great economist not only called this one wrong, but later, along with most other government and private economists ignored a very explicit warning—See {637168}, {637986}, and {620038}.
Many companies appear to be doing much better than they really are. Often they employ PR professionals to create that impression. Some companies are not even solvent, but the only way we can all tell is to have a recession generally or in that particular sector—the equivalent of the tide going out.
She had warned about the unregulated derivatives 10 years earlier, but to no avail. See {637987}. Then when she had been proven prescient in the Meltdown of 2008, Congress was more interested in how she thought they could prevent future problems with derivatives. Some were adopted but not all. The financial institutions claimed that they needed derivatives to hedge positions and hence “stabilize” the system. Of the members of Congress who voted on this issue, almost none understood derivatives and credit default swaps were and how they worked. But some were sure they were bad, and others were sure that they were necessary for stability. Derivatives can, and did, get so complicated that the people who originally created them sometimes cannot tell whether they are at risk or not. Even computer cannot calculate the value and risks of these instruments because the values and risks depend on what happens to other companies or instruments which themselves have derivatives insuring them. See {620038} for a good description of the difficulty.
The Meltdown of 2008 came a year later and Citigroup, one of the largest banks in America, had massive liquidity problems and in order to stave off bankruptcy the taxpayers had to come up with $45 Billion. The bank executives, as this quotation demonstrates, knew that they were in a very risky situation and that if the subprime mortgages started to default, the “music would stop” and they and the other banks would have a massive liquidity problem. None the less, they kept on investing more and more of their bank customer’s money and making money in what they knew was a highly risky enterprise. The greed clouded their judgment and when the music stopped and many were no longer dancing, the Meltdown of 2008 almost destroyed the entire national economy and triggered the Great Recession where the overwhelming proportion of Americans had to suffer for the greed of those who could not “stop dancing” even as they knew it was very dangerous.
Affilations and Employment CURRICULUM VITAE Robert E. Litan 2015- Chief Economist, Patent Properties (public company devoted to improving The matching of patent owners with licensees) 2014- Of Counsel, Korein Tillery law firm (St. Louis and Chicago) Senior litigation adviser in complex lawsuits 2014- Non-resident Senior Fellow, The Brookings Institution, Washington, D.C. Authoring studies of regulation, financial institutions and entrepreneurship 2014- Regular Contributor, Wall Street Journal “Think Tank” Blog 2014- Special Consultant, Economists, Inc., Washington, D.C. 2014- Senior Consultant, The Brattle Group, Washington, D.C. 2014- Member, Board of Advisors, Neighborly, Kansas City, Mo. (a municipal bond crowd funding platform) 2012-14 Director of Research, Bloomberg-Gov, Washington, D.C. Oversaw a team of analysts covering business impact of federal governmental decisions; authoring weekly columns on a wide range of policy topics behind the BGov paywall (and sometimes for Bloomberg.com). 2003-12 Vice President, Research and Policy, Ewing Marion Kauffman Foundation Oversaw multi-million dollar research grant program and related personnel Relating to the SEconomics and Law of Economic Growth, Innovation And Entrepreneurship Member of the Senior Management Team 2003-12 Senior Fellow, Economic Studies Program, The Brookings Institution Conducted and published research on financial institutions, regulatory issues Organizer and Editor, Annual Conference on International Financial Issues, with the Tokyo Club (2003-11) Director, AEI-Brookings Joint Center on Regulatory Studies (1998-2007) Co-Editor, The Brookings-Wharton Papers on Financial Services (1997-2003) 1996-2003 Vice President and Director, Economic Studies Program and Cabot Family Chair in Economics, The Brookings Institution Responsible for supervising the Institution’s economic research program, its 26 scholars and support staff, and for administering and raising funds for a $9 million annual research program; continuing research on financial institutions, trade, and legal and economic issues relating to the information revolution 1995-96 Associate Director, U.S. Office of Management Budget -- Responsible for budgets and clearance of policy for five cabinet agencies (Commerce, HUD, Justice, Treasury and Transportation) and most of the independent agencies of the U.S. Government (requiring supervision of approximately 70 professional staff) 1993-95 Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Division, Department of Justice -- Supervision of approximately 150 attorneys and paralegals in non -merger civil antitrust investigations; Developing DOJ policy on regulatory issues; Active participation in the development of the Administration's policies on telecommunications, trade and various regulatory issues 1984-1993 Senior Fellow, Economic Studies Program; Director (1987-92), Center for 1982-90 1979-1982 1977-1979 1974-1976 1972-1973 1970-1971 3 Economic Progress and Employment; and Director (1992-93), Center for Law, Economics, and Politics, The Brookings Institution, Washington, D.C., - - Research and writing on financial institutions; international trade; and regulatory policy. Powell, Goldstein, Frazer & Murphy, law firm, Washington, D.C.: Senior Associate (1982-84); Partner (1984); Of Counsel (1984-90) -- Attorney specializing in administrative law, antitrust, banking, energy, international trade, and legal issues generally involving law and economics. Arnold & Porter, law firm, Washington, D.C., Associate. President's Council of Economic Advisers, Executive Office of the President, Washington,D.C. RegulatoryandEnergySpecialist;principalstaffforthe Regulatory Analysis Review Group; handled selected legal issues for the Council. Peabody, Rivlin, Lambert & Meyers - summer legal associate. The Brookings Institution, Washington, D.C. - research assistant to Dr. Arthur M. Okun. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., Wichita, Kansas - two summers as an intern tax accountant. Board/Advisory Committee Memberships and Other Affiliations 2014- Advisory Board, Neighborl.y – KC-based startup offering crowdfunding platform Municipal/state bonds 2013- Advisory Grants Committee Board, Smith Richardson Foundation 2011-12 Bush Institute, Dallas Texas, Bush Fellow (on the Institute’s “4% Growth Project”) 2012 Member, Advisory Group, OECD Entrepreneurial Studies Initiative (2012-14) 2011- Co-Chair, National Academy of Sciences Panel on Measuring Innovation 2011-12 Member, Advisory Board, Filene Institute (credit union research organization) 2010-12 Member, International Financial Advisory Board, The Principal Group (Major global life insurer/money manager) 2009-10 2009-12 2009- 2008-09 2007- 2007- 2007- 2005-07 2004 -07 1996- 2000- 02 2000-01 1999- 1999-2001 1999-2001 2007- 1997-98 1996 1993-94 Member, Pew Task Force on Financial Reform Member, Advisory Committee, Goldman Sachs’ ’10,000 Small Businesses Initiative’ Member, Research Advisory Board, Committee for Economic Development Member, Advisory Committee on Voluntary Foreign Aid (of the U.S. Agency For International Development) Contributing Editor, Inc Magazine Member Panelist, National Academy of Sciences, Study on the Use of Scientific Evidence Member, Research Advisory Board, Center for Audit Quality Co-Chairman, Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA, formerly NASD) Ahead of the Curve Advisory Group Member, Proxy Governance Council, Folio Fn Member, Shadow Financial Regulatory Committee; Co-Chairman 1998-2002 Juniper Financial, Board of Advisers Double Click, Inc., Board of Privacy Advisers Milken Review (Board of Editors) American Antitrust Institute, Board of Advisers Committee for Economic Development, Board of Advisers Chairman, National Research Council Committee on Disaster Loss Estimation (And co-author of The Impacts of Natural Disasters: A Framework for Loss Estimation). Department of Defense, Defense Sciences Board, Member of Task Force on Vertical Integration in the Defense Industry Department of Defense, Defense Sciences Board, Member of Task Force on Mergers within the Defense Industry 4 1991-93 Chairman, Editorial Advisory Board, Public Policy Studies Series for the Insurance Information Institute. 1991-92 Presidential-Congressional Commission on the Causes of the Savings and Loan Crisis (Member) 1988-90 Conference Board of Canada Financial Institutions Group (Advisory Board). 1988-90 Foundation for Change (Board of Directors). 1988-89 Member of Advisory Board to Office of Technology Assessment Study on Technological Change in Banking and Securities Markets. Awards 2011 Inaugural Massey Price for Excellence in Research in Capital Markets and Innovation awarded by the University of Texas Law School 2001 Zale Award for Excellence in Public Policy, Stanford University 1976 Felix S. Cohen Prize for best essay in legal philosophy, Yale Law School 5 1970-72 University of Pennsylvania; Thouron Fellowship for Graduate Study in Great Britain(which was not used); Royal Society of Arts Silver Medal (National award given to selected outstanding graduating seniors in the U.S.); Class of 1946 Award (given by the University to an outstanding graduating senior); William D. Gordon Award (given by the Wharton School to the graduating senior with the highest scholastic average); Beta Gamma Sigma Award (given by the Wharton School to the graduating senior with the highest scholastic average); Albert A. Berg Scholarship Award, 1971, 1972, (given each year by the Wharton Faculty to an outstanding upperclassman in the Wharton School). Teaching 2010 Command General Staff College, Ft. Leavenworth Co-taught course on economic growth in post-conflict situations 2003-10 Teacher of law and economics to state judges as part of the AEI- Brookings Judicial Education Program (later Northwestern Law School) 1993 Taught principles of Western banking to Russian bankers (under a Treasury Department grant administered by KPMG Peat Marwick) 1989-90 1986-87 1976-1977 1975-1976 Yale Law School - Visiting Lecturer in Law (Banking). Yale University - Lecturer in Economics (taught Economics and Law; and Elementary Macroeconomics; both large lecture courses). Yale University - Instructor in Economics (taught two sections of Elementary Micro and Macroeconomics). Consulting Relationships 2014- Senior Consultant, The Brattle Group 2011-12 Senior Consultant, Global Economics Group, Washington, D.C. (Antitrust Issues) 2008-12 Senior Consultant, Navigant Economics (Antitrust, general economic issues) 2006-08 Senior Consultant, Criterion Associates (and later “Empiris”), Washington, D.C. (Antitrust, general economic issues) 2004-present Senior Consultant, Charles River Associates (antitrust and financial issue 1999-2002 Special Consultant, Analysis Group (Economic consulting firm) 1996-2002 Special Consultant, Economists, Inc. (Economic consulting firm) Education 1987 Yale University: Ph.D. in Economics. Dissertation: An Economic Inquiry Into the Expansion of Bank Powers. (Dissertation Committee: Professors Richard Levin, Merton Peck and James Tobin). 1977 Yale University: J.D. (1977), Extra-curricular Activities: Yale Legislative Services, Barrister's Union; Employment, Consulting and Teaching 1973-1977 1976 Yale University: M. Phil. in Economics, Distinction in Ph.D. oral examinations (international trade and finance, industrial organization). 1968-72 Wharton School of Finance and Commerce, University of Pennsylvania: B.S. 6 Publications Books 7 Economics, summa cum laude (Valedictorian); Major - Finance; Minors - Accounting, Statistics and Mathematics. Extra-curricular Activities: Chairman, Activities Council (major student government body); Executive Editor of Wharton Account (major undergraduate business magazine); Vice-President of Debate Council; 2 years in intercollegiate debate; President, Beta Gamma Sigma; Friars Senior Honor Society; Beta Alpha Psi; Employment in Electrical Engineering Library (4 years). The Trillion Dollar Economists (Wiley, Fall 2014) The Need for Speed: Broadband Policy for the 21rst Century, Brookings Institutions Press (with Hal Singer, February, 2013). Better Capitalism. Yale University Press, 2012 (with Carl Schramm) Good Capitalism, Bad Capitalism, and the Economics of Growth And Prosperity. Yale University Press, 2007 (with William Baumol and Carl Schramm) Competitive Equity: A Better Way to Organize Mutual Funds AEI Press, 2007 (with Peter Wallison) Worldwide Financial Reporting: The Development and Future of Accounting Standards Oxford University Press, 2006 (with George Benston, Michael Bromwich and Alfred Wagenhofer, Financial Statecraft, Yale University Press, 2006 (with Benn Steil) Named by Library Journal as one of the two best business Books of 2006 Following The Money: The Enron Failure and the State of Corporate Disclosure, AEI-Brookings Joint Center on Regulatory Studies, 2003 (with George Benston, Michael Bromwich and Alfred Wagenhofer) Protecting the American Homeland (Brookings Institution Press, 2002, With other Brookings co-authors) Sticking Together: The Israeli Experiment in Pluralism (Brookings Institution Press, 2002, with Yaakov Kop) Beyond The Dot.Coms (Brookings Institution Press, 2001, with Alice Rivlin) The GAAP Gap: Corporate Disclosure in the Internet Age (AEI-Brookings Joint Center on Regulatory Studies, 2000). None of Your Business: World Data Flows, Electronic Commerce, and The European Privacy Directive (with Peter Swire), Brookings (1998) Globaphobia: Confronting Fears About Open Trade (with Gary Burtless, Robert Lawrence and Robert Shapiro), Brookings, Progressive Policy Institute, and the Twentieth Century Fund, 1998 American Finance for the 21st Century (with the assistance of Jonathan Rauch), U.S. Department of the Treasury (1997) and Brookings (1998) Going Digital! (with William Niskanen), Brookings Institution Press and the Cato Institute (1998) 8 Books Edited Footing The Bill For Superfund Cleanups (with Don Fullerton, Paul Portney and Kate Probst), Brookings Institution and Resources for the Future, 1995 Financial Regulation in the Global Economy (with Richard Herring), Brookings Institution, 1994 Growth With Equity: Economic Policymaking For The Next Century (with Martin Baily and Gary Burtless), Brookings Institution, 1993. Physical Damage and Human Loss: The Economic Impact of Earthquake Mitigation Measures (with Frederick Krimgold, Karen Clark, and Jayant Khadilkar), Insurance Information Institute, 1992. The Future of American Banking (with James Barth and R. Dan Brumbaugh, Jr.), W. E. Sharpe, 1992. The Revolution in U.S. Finance, Brookings Institution, 1991. What Should Banks Do?, Brookings Institution, 1987. Saving Free Trade: A Pragmatic Approach (with Robert Z. Lawrence), Brookings Institution, 1986. Reforming Federal Regulation (with William D. Nordhaus), Yale University Press, 1983.