Alexey Arbatov Quotes


Not since June 1941 has the Russian military stood as perilously close to ruin as it does now.


Context

June 1941 was the date that Nazi Germany invaded Russia.


Citations

Alexey Arbatov, Deputy of the Russian Duma, “Military Reform in Russia”, International Security, Spring 1998

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The Russians had lost over 20 million of its people to German WWII hostilities. They wanted a vengeance and were willing to take the casualties that came with the invasion of Berlin and many other key cities that were heavily defended. Eisenhower and Churchill realized that this would give the Russians a very dominant military occupation of Eastern Europe and Eastern Germany. However, they did not want to take the huge casualties of all these battles. Politically, Churchill and American leaders had to explain to their right wings why Russia was involved as an equal partner in making occupation decisions about Germany.


He was right. Before WWII Russia was not considered a very important country in the world, but having emerged from WWII, Russia was stronger than ever and counties like Germany and Italy were in ruins.


The Germans had invaded Russia who despite losing over 20 million people continued to fight the Germans who had never had to deploy forces over such a large territory. But it was the severe Russian Winter that turned the tide. Germans were not equipped or dressed for the terrible winter. The Russians were used to it. The Germans were repulsed and had to retreat back into Germany.


Many people mistakenly believe that this was the first political use of the “iron curtain” phrase—in German, “eiserner vorhang.” However, George Washington Crile used the phrase in 1915 {598870}. It is not known whether Geobbels knew of Crile’s work, or if Winston Churchill in his famous speech {411311} was familiar with either Crille’s or Goebbels use.


The Emperor was writing to his son to explain the defeat of Japan. In what was a bit of revisionist history, the Emperor neglected to mention that with the exception of some of the incursions in China, Hirohito had personally approved every Japanese invasion including Pearl Harbor. Further, it was he who had approved the orders that Japanese troops should fight to the death rather than retreat or surrender.


In this case, the Speaker of the House attacked the President of his own party for being willing to conduct disarmament discussions with the Russians. He implied that the outcome could be the appeasement of the Russians just as British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain appeased Hitler in 1938 in Munich, giving the German Fuhrer the “green light” to take over Europe. The Conservative Caucus went even further and explicitly called it “appeasement”. Reagan however always talked about military strength and power, and provided plenty of money for the military and weapons a few of which were boondoggles but he was a very cautious American president in authorizing military force. And he not only was willing to discuss arms control and reductions and enter into treaties for disarmament, much to the distress of the hawks of his own party. Few American Presidents have so well balanced the use of diplomacy with the threat of military force as well as Reagan.


Several weeks before the Russians launched Sputnik, our team at the Jet Propulsion Laboratory asked permission to place a rocket in orbit around the Earth. We could to it with two days of preparation. We had been doing experiments with 2 stage rockets to test materials and designs for nose-cones returning from space. We launched rockets straight up. At the maximum height we turned it around and fired the second stage to drive it straight back to Earth so it could achieve the speed of an object returning from space. We were developing more and more powerful second stage rockets. We had just calculated that our newest second stage had more than enough thrust to, after the ascent, turn the rocket at right angles to the perpendicular, and fire the rocket into orbit around the earth. We could do this easily. The military were initially very enthusiastic. America could be the first nation that put a satellite in orbit. However, the authorities in Washington, not only refused us permission to try, but postponed a number of our regular launches and forbade us from talking to anyone about our capability or request for our experiment.. When Sputnik was launched into orbit a few weeks later, we were really puzzled. No one ever explained why Washington had refused us permission, but we came up with a theory: The issue of the legality under international law of one country having its satellite in orbit over another country’s airspace was not at all settled. If we did satellite reconnaissance in the future over the Soviet Union, the Russians could claim that was an act of war. And we had extensive plans to create such satellites and launch them when we solved all the technical problems in the future. We believe that the authorities knew that the Russians were about to launch Sputnik. By allowing them to be the first to launch, it would be they—not us—who would be setting the precedent of sending satellites over other nation’s airspace and claiming this was not aggression or an act of war as they thought they were way ahead of us. In addition, after WWII, President Eisenhower was having difficulty getting Congress to spend money on rocketry and satellites as well as science and technology including science and mathematics education which was then terrible in America. So allowing the Russians to “beat us” the administration had the issue that they needed, and they allowed the Russians to set the legal precedents that they would have opposed if we were ahead of them and orbited a satellite first. Either President Eisenhower and his team were brilliantly shrewd or they were pretty dumb because we easily could have put our rockets in orbit then.


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Generally, the American military is much more optimistic of its ability to accomplish its objectives as that it the way they have been trained. The General warns that the same attitude will make them more optimistic and willing to tackle a very difficult if not impossible problem than most would be. So civilians in America have to question what they are doing. At the same time, there have been a number of highly sophisticated military officers who have both a military and civilian perspective and education. They tend to be more realistic and at times argue against military deployments and missions that are being considered. However, once deployed and committed, it is culturally difficult or impossible for a member of the military to be pessimistic about the eventual


He was objecting to the current crop of senior military officer who have little experience in fighting and much in academic, strategic and technical training. Many however see him as a dinosaur who does not realized the complex nature of the modern military missions. In general, we have won almost all of our fighting battles but often failed in our maintaining civil society, occupation, nation building, military procurement, preventing sexual assault of our own troops by our own soldiers, assuring mental health of our soldiers. Hackworth, detractors argue, wants to change what already works and ignore what does not.


The alternative deterrent was to maintain an army of over 2 million men overseas in both Europe and Asia, and the cost was much greater than the then perceived cost of nuclear weapons. At the time no one figured the cost of coping with the radioactive material and waste as well as the cleanup of nuclear bomb factories like Hanford. These costs were still not known byt the 21st century.


Alexey Arbatov
Alexey Arbatov
  • Born: January 17, 1951
  • Nationality: Russian
  • Profession: Political Scientist, Politician, Author

Dr. Alexei Georgievich Arbatov, PhD is a full member of the Russian Academy of Sciences, the Head of the Center for International Security at the Institute of World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO), and a scholar in residence at the Carnegie Moscow Center. He is a Russian political scientist, academic, author, and former politician.