James F. Leonard Jr. Quotes


The treaty … had absolutely nothing in the way of verification or enforcement provisions. Everybody recognized that this was a grave deficiency, but I make no apology for the treaty. We really had a choice of concluding a treaty without any verification measures or having no treaty at all.


Citations

James F. Leonard Jr., U.S. ambassador to the UN Conference on Disarmament, Lead U.S. negotiator for the Biological Weapons Convention, U. S. Ambassador to the United Nations, Discussion of the Arms Control Treaty of 1972, Arms Control Association Press Conference. November 16, 2001

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Goldwater had predicted that the LBJ campaign would attack him for some of his warlike and aggressive statements and try and depict him as someone not responsible enough for the Presidency. He was personally convinced that his hard line policies would inhibit Russian aggression. He prepared this and other ads, but the voters were not persuaded and Goldwater was trounced.


There were many who thought that the Russians would view the Mutual Security Act as aggressive and they might respond with some kind of aggressive retaliation and this could lead to war. Others felt that containment would reduce the likelihood of war.


Like many in the 1920s, Dewar saw the Communist Soviet Union as the biggest potential risk to peace. However, although the Russian leaders constantly castigated the West, they did not have a large military, and were for the most part highly anti-war as they saw war as the product of Capitalistic competition and the tool of the aristocracy. They had little military equipment and almost no training or officer corps with which to build any Army. Germany in contrast had the skill, experience, officers, a history of aggression, and huge resentment over what they considered their humiliating WWI defeat and peace terms. They would start WWII, not Russia.


The immediate crisis had been averted and no more nuclear missiles would enter Cuba. But we had no leverage to get the few that were already there removed and it would be politically very difficult for the Kennedy administration to get the public to accept ANY nuclear missiles in Cuba. Hence, Stevenson’s statement. See {634554}. Neither side had great intercontinental ballistic missile capability at the time, and we had placed a large battery of missiles in Turkey very close to the Russian border. This gave the U. S. a major military advantage. We could deliver many more nuclear warheads to Russia than they could to the United States. The Russians with this proposal hoped to even the capability. The military advisers and the security and State Department advisors all thought that the U. S. should not give up its nuclear superiority. However, we had no international legal basis for denying the Cubans the right to locate any weapons on their soil, so to prevent the Communists from having nuclear missiles in Cuba we would have to use force which could easily escalate into a nuclear war. Kennedy and McCone both thought that since we had intercontinental ballistic missiles in production and coming on line and would not need the Turkey Missiles to strike all over Russia. So giving up our missile advantage for a short time would not expose us to any undue risk. The other advisors worried that the production of the ICBMs could be delayed—weapons systems were (and are) notoriously longer in production than estimated or planned. They also thought that the morale of the military and civilian population would suffer when they learned that we had given away our military advantage. There was a macho element in their thinking in that we would be giving in to intimidation and look like we were afraid to fight. Last, the political advisors thought that the right wing hawks would pillory the administration for its cowardice in allowing itself to be intimidated by the Russians. Their doctrine was that when faced with force, the Communists will always back down. In the final deal we agreed to remove our missiles from Turkey in 6 months and this would be done in complete secrecy and the Russians would keep the deal secret. That way, Kennedy got 6 more months of production which turned out to have been enough. The public would never know till years later and the Conservatives would not be able to publicly castigate Kennedy. Meanwhile, the conservatives would continue to believe that the Russians backed down in the face of force—the naval blockade as this was ‘proved’ their doctrine when the Russians had not backed down at all. The strategy and tactics of the Kennedy administration are still analyzed and argued about today with many Americans just realizing that we did not intimidate the Russians with force or the threat of force to remove their Cuban missiles.


Samuel Langhorne Clemens, 1835-1910. His view was that the quality of statesmanship at the time was bellicose and imperialistic. We had annexed Puerto Rico and Cuba and then occupied the Philippines. He argued that if we did not have the bombastic and expansionist statesmen like McKinley and Theodore Roosevelt, we would not need so much armament to back them up.


Stalin did not want any political opposition with its own militia. American gun control opponents often cite this quotation to show that in Russia, Stalin achieved dictatorial power by disarming the population in general and only allowing government officials to have guns. They argue that even Stalin could not have tyrannized the entire Soviet Union if every citizen had the right to bear arms as provided for by the Second Amendment.


Laws that do not work can be repealed by Congress with the President’s signature. However, if there is an international treaty, the United States may NOT change the laws to fix something that does not work. At best, the administration can try to re-negotiate the treaty, but has no power to assure the change unless, it withdraws from the treaty. However, most treaties are very complex and involve many elements and there is no way to withdraw from a single aspect of a treaty, even if it is a bad aspect.


Some people believe that the United States pressured Pakistan to enable America to support the Mujahideen in their effort to fight the Russian occupation of Afghanistan. Actually the President (and virtual dictator) of Pakistan wanted aid from America and was offering bases. America did not want bases but did want a platform for arming and training the Mujahideen, Pakistan allowed us to use Pakistan as a platform. We increased our foreign aid to Pakistan by 500 percent. There was no arm twisting.


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