Henry Paulson Quotes

There will no longer be need for spheres of influence, for alliances, balances of power ...

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the United States and China are more likely to view each other as competitors if not adversaries. But the die has not been cast. The best possible outcome is a new understanding that when they cannot cooperate, they will coexist and allow all countries in the Pacific to grow and thrive.

The international order established at the end of World War II could certainly have been worse. However, this order did contain certain factors which bore within them the seeds of instability.

President Nixon was a pragmatic strategist. He would engage, not contain, China, but he would also quietly set pieces into place for a fallback position should China not play according to the rules as a good global citizen.

For the Kremlin, it is more feasible to preserve its great-power status in cooperation with the United States than in confrontation.

This radical transformation of world power relationships reflects primarily in the case of both the USA and the USSR the growth of the productive forces.

With the rise of America, the global balance of power shifted away from the old European powers.

Unilateralism will lead to the decline of American Power.

The Cold War is over. The world has become much more complicated.

U. S. foreign policy in the 20th century was characterized by disastrous oscillations between over-commitment and isolation

The most important relationship in the world is the U. S. - China relationship.

Russia and China completely disagree with the international order that was established after World War II, and they're trying to take it apart right before our eyes.

Most of the conversation about how geopolitics is changing in the 21st century focuses on the shift from west to east and on how we're moving from the bipolar power equation of the Cold War to a new bipolar relationship, that of the U.S. and China, that determines the mood music for everyone else.

The Sino-American competition involves two significant realities that distinguish it from the Cold War: neither party is excessively ideological in its orientation; and both parties recognize that they really need mutual accommodation.

America is not really a strong enough state for us to regard it as an enemy of Russia.

When great powers fade, as they inevitably must, it's normally for one of two reasons. Some powers exhaust themselves through overreach abroad, underinvestment at home, or a mixture of the two. This was the case for the Soviet Union. Other powers lose their privileged position with the emergence of new, stronger powers.

Washington sees the various local and national conflicts in the Middle East as part of a battle for regional hegemony between the U.S. and Iran.

The world is shifting from a hegemonic era, where the United States dominated alone, to a multipolar system.

In the long march of history, at least two poles of attraction and antagonism have been the norm in world politics. Rarely has only one nation carried the burden of leadership. The unipolar world of the 21st century, dominated for the past two decades by the United States, is a historical anomaly.

American presence is, you know, the major cause of balance of power and the stability in this region.

During the Cold War, America took sides not only in disputes between Arab countries, but also in debates within them.

The world is now unipolar and contains o-nly o-ne superpower. Canada shares a continent with that superpower.

I don't believe, in the 21st century, in the balance of power system. This is a European idea of the 19th and 20th centuries.

I've been to China and Russia, and I don't know anything about Chinese or Soviet relations.

People were really interested in what was going on because of the international context of the Cold War.