Ramzan Kadyrov Quotes

For the Kremlin, it is more feasible to preserve its great-power status in cooperation with the United States than in confrontation.

There will no longer be need for spheres of influence, for alliances, balances of power ...

It has become increasingly clear that Pakistan’s chief aim in aligning with the West was to gain support against India

I don't worry about superpower confrontation. You know, I lived through the Cold War days, and where everybody was worried about a Soviet Union armed to the teeth. I think we're going to get along fine with Russia, and I don't see them as internationally ambitious.

I think Russia is dangerous, not a superpower. I know what the president is trying to say. I worked for him for five years, not just two.He doesn't want us to overreact. He doesn't want to go back to the Cold War and some superpower competition. But my own view, and I think General Mattis stated something similar today, is that Russia is a challenge for the United States. It is a threat to some of our allies.

I thought that in general we in the United States were too optimistic in believing that the Soviets might alter what had been for a long time, as a matter of fact for centuries, fundamental Russian policies in respect to the rest of the world.

President Nixon was a pragmatic strategist. He would engage, not contain, China, but he would also quietly set pieces into place for a fallback position should China not play according to the rules as a good global citizen.

This fact lays on us - so long as the maintenance of good relations with Russia seems to us worth an effort - the duty of satisfying Russia that she has no need to fear any invasion of her sphere of interests on Germany's part.

That's the problem with Russia: The world has changed. Europe is not at war, and no one wants to negotiate with us. The world has changed, but Russia prefers to pretend it has not.

You've got to remember the Cold War was a very real thing then, so the relationship with the United States was very, very important. As was the relationship that I was developing with China: that was something I did very much. And they weren't conflicting things.

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the United States and China are more likely to view each other as competitors if not adversaries. But the die has not been cast. The best possible outcome is a new understanding that when they cannot cooperate, they will coexist and allow all countries in the Pacific to grow and thrive.

It's Russia some people would like to get rid of. They are still afraid of our nuclear deterrent. We have our own foreign policy whether they like it or not.

American presence is, you know, the major cause of balance of power and the stability in this region.

I believe the U.S. already understands and will understand more and more that only a strong Russia will respond to the genuine interests of the United States.

We didn't push the Russians to intervene, but we knowingly increased the probability that they would.

Many agree that the worst thing that could ever happen is if Russia and China get closer.

The United States and Russia probably do not have common aims and dreams, but they have common worries: Both Washington and Moscow are concerned about the rise of China and are threatened by the rise of radical Islam.

You know, in the WikiLeaks cables, the Chinese discovered that Kevin Rudd was urging the Americans to keep the military option open against them. This is hardly a friendly gesture.

The United States has dealt with the Middle East and surrounding regions for many decades in the context of the Cold War.

Mr. Chamberlain desires to avert the threat to England's peace by making England, in alliance with Germany, stronger than her rivals and so to force them to renounce their hostile intentions against her.

Great powers engage.

We [the Russians] are going to do something terrible to you [America]—we are going to deprive you of an enemy.

Pakistan was once called the most allied ally of the United States. We are now the most nonallied.

Containment was merely appeasement on the installment plan.

U. S. foreign policy in the 20th century was characterized by disastrous oscillations between over-commitment and isolation