George C. Marshall Quotes
I do not see Japanese invasion of the Philippines as a probability because the hazards would be too great for the Japanese .... We know a great deal that the Japanese are not aware we know, and we are familiar with their plans to a certain extent ... .
President Roosevelt and Secretary of state Cordell hull felt that a Japanese invasion of the Philippines was a likelihood. The army chief of staff disagreed citing his intelligence reports. Japan of course attacked Pearl Harbor and then invaded the Philippines. Marshall, perhaps America’s greatest military administrator, turned out to be wrong while the President and Secretary of State proved more accurate in their assesment of the Japanese threat. This quotation stands as a testament to the fact that the intelligence fiascoes of the Iraq war are not unique in American military history.
George C. Marshall, 1880-1959, General & U. S. Army Chief of Staff, U. S. Secretary of State, U. S. Secretary of Defense, Statement, November 1941
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Some say that President Roosevelt had instructed the war department to issue warnings to the military forces in the Philippines and the Pacific. Military intelligence argued against the Japanese attack on the Philippines—and did not think any attack anywhere very likely. When the president insisted, warnings went out and this is what was sent to General Short. The warning was ambiguous and Short did very little and was caught unprepared shortly thereafter. How much reliance should be placed on intelligence estimates has been a question that has been argued before World War II and after.
Although the FBI had identified the emerging Nazi danger in the United States as early as 1933, the military, and the Congress were not aware of their findings. Nor were the media and the public.
He was describing a meeting that he and General Marshall had conducted with FDR, Secretary of State Cordell Hull and others. In less than two weeks, the Japanese would attack Pearl Harbor without any declaration of war, as Marshall had predicted.
The Admiral had spent time in the United States. He strongly opposed Japanese warring against America. When his recommendations, were rejected and war was decided upon, Yamamoto planned and commanded the Attack on Pearl Harbor.
even though in this case the objective The State Department, the Defense Department and most important President Kennedy had decided to get rid of Diem. Most of the Central Intelligence Agency thought that this was a very unwise policy, because Diem was a known risk, and the people who would replace him and their talents and policies were unknown. The negatives of Diem—the facts that he, a Christian, was persecuting the majority Buddhists, was totally corrupt, and not a very good leader was less distressful to the CIA than to the President and the other agencies as the intelligence agency frequently not only tolerated “offensive” allies, but actually employed them including war criminals. Another importance of this quotation is that it shows that it was by no means certain that the CIA would always follow the orders of the President and the government policy makers. Colby, who was not the agency director at that time but was the head of the South East Bureau, was one high level official who argued that the policies should always be followed even if they were unwise or foolish. Another importance of this quotation is that it illustrate a common error that administrations are frequently forced to make: making a policy decision to eliminate a problem while not having much of an idea of what the alternative or consequence would be when the policy is implemented. The Syrian Civil War in 2013 was a good example. The Government side appeared to have used Chemical Warfare on Civilians and public opinion demanded that we do something. However, having a no-fly zone or any of the alternatives to prevent (punish) the government for the Chemical Warfare would strengthen the rebel side which was made up of numerous factions—some of which were known Islamic fundamentalist terrorists and jihadists. If the balance of power were tipped toward the rebels, the consequence for the American national interests were unknown—just as the consequence of ousting Diem was unknown and turned out to also be bad and was probably worse.
Precursor to CIA. During WWII Donovan’s OSS, the FBI and the State Department had the three civilian intelligence organizations while each of the 4 Armed Services had their own intelligence services. Rarely did any of these 7 organizations communicate with any of the others. In the case of the OSS, the FBI and the military services tended to try and obstruct many of their operations. This was the first call for what became the CIA.
After the invasion, much of the intelligence upon which America relied on Invading Iraq turned out to be completely wrong. It turned out that the Vice President at least, a major supporter of the invasion, had a role in “shaping” the intelligence and analysis to achieve a policy objective.
His concern was well placed. For over half a century thereafter, the tail did wag the dog, and while there have been many successful covert operations, the risk and current pressure siphoned off talent and management attention from intelligence—the Central Intelligence Agency’s primary job.
Precursor to CIA. Stephenson was the British leading intelligence and espionage expert who served as the Intelligence Advisor to Winston Churchill in WWII. He was very forthcoming in teaching Donavan and the new OSS much of what they learned about spy-craft and intelligence operations.
George Catlett Marshall Jr. was an American soldier and statesman. He rose through the United States Army to become Chief of Staff under presidents Franklin D. Roosevelt and Harry S. Truman, then served as Secretary of State and Secretary of Defense under Truman. Winston Churchill lauded Marshall as the "organizer of victory" for his leadership of the Allied victory in World War II. After the war, he spent a frustrating year trying and failing to avoid the impending civil war in China. As Secretary of State, Marshall advocated a U.S. economic and political commitment to post-war European recovery, including the Marshall Plan that bore his name. In recognition of this work, he was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 1953.