Carol Loomis Quotes
Every regulatory speech on derivatives takes a bow to their hedging 'benefits.' Less publicly, regulators pay their respects to derivative profits, a blessed relief from the banks' troubled loans to less-developed countries, highly leveraged companies, and real estate swingers.
Loomis, Carol J. "The Risk That Won't Go Away." Fortune, Time Inc., 7 Mar. 1994.
It was the souped up nature of the credit default swaps that was in part responsible for the souped up melt down of the economy of 2008 and the great recession thereafter. A credit default swap is an insurance policy that a company will pay off its bonds and not go bankrupt. It is a cross between an insurance mechanism and a stock exchange type security mechanism and through heavy lobbying escaped any kind of regulation. It cost a company no money to write a credit default swap and they were paid to do so. As long as business and the economy was good, it was a terrific business but there was no way of ever knowing how much risk they were taking. So companies who wrote credit default swaps did not have to have the money to pay to back them up if they business was bad. When that happened in 2008 even the largest insurance company in the world collapsed because of the risk of having to pay the credit default swap and the U. S. Government had to take over the insurance company. In 2010, the Obama administration passed a financial reform bill that began to regulate credit default swaps.
Speculation meant real estate investment and business.
The States sold bonds to finance the their efforts in the Revolutionary War. Some states had better prospects for redeeming their bonds than others. Georgia, South Carolina and North Carolina in particular had poorer prospects than most and their bonds were selling at about 25 cents on the dollar. Alexander Hamilton, then the Secretary of the Treasury, wanted the new Federal government to assume the state’s war debt and pay off the bonds. He made his proposal for how he would accomplish this on January 14, 1790. He delivered his report and proposal to Congress “Report on the Public Credit”. As soon as Hamilton’s proposal was read in Congress, sophisticated speculators set off for the Southern States to buy up as many bonds as they could before the owners found out that a Federal bail-out was under serious consideration. They could easily double, triple or even quadruple their money. Many congressmen wanted to outlaw the speculation. See {619929} & {619939}. The pro-speculation forces got their way. Some speculators made fortunes. Most bondholders lost money.
She had warned about the unregulated derivatives 10 years earlier, but to no avail. See {637987}. Then when she had been proven prescient in the Meltdown of 2008, Congress was more interested in how she thought they could prevent future problems with derivatives. Some were adopted but not all. The financial institutions claimed that they needed derivatives to hedge positions and hence “stabilize” the system. Of the members of Congress who voted on this issue, almost none understood derivatives and credit default swaps were and how they worked. But some were sure they were bad, and others were sure that they were necessary for stability. Derivatives can, and did, get so complicated that the people who originally created them sometimes cannot tell whether they are at risk or not. Even computer cannot calculate the value and risks of these instruments because the values and risks depend on what happens to other companies or instruments which themselves have derivatives insuring them. See {620038} for a good description of the difficulty.
Carol Junge Loomis is an American financial journalist, who retired in 2014 as senior editor-at-large at Fortune magazine.
