Martin Feldstein Quotes
Although the Fed has subjected banks’ portfolios to stress tests to measure the effect of rising interest rates and investment losses, the results might not have shown the whole picture: U.S. banks, particularly small and medium-sized ones, may not have enough capital to maintain solvency and liquidity should their risky loans and investments fail in large numbers. The same is true of the stress tests that the ECB has performed in Europe,
Martin Feldstein, "The Fed's Unconventional Monetary Policy: Why Danger Lies Ahead", Foreign Affairs, May/June, 2016
Sourced by: Eigen's Political and Historical Quotations
"Market mispricing" is an economic euphanism for the bankers and major investors of the nation (and abroad) bidding up the prices of the assets in order to continue to squeeze large profits even after they knew that the assets had been far overpriced. Few wanted to stop playing hoping the music would not stop in the economic game of musical chairs. When it did, there were not enough "seats" and failures casued other failures and the contagion spread.
U. S. Treasury Secretary Larry Summers called Rajan a “Luddite” for this view, but what Rajan observed and predicted was exactly what happened in the Meltdown of 2008 which led to the Great Recession. Rajan was one of the few economists to call this right. Several, invested their own money assuming a crash and made billions. Most, like Summers and the Federal Reserve Chairmen in retrospect admitted that they missed the signs and didn’t connect the dots. See {637168}, {637987}, and {620038}
The President had a series of radio talks to the people in which he addressed them directly and explained things as he then understood them.
Born thought that her agency was responsible for regulating the new esoteric financial products—derivatives including credit default swaps—for otherwise there would be no regulation at all of financial products that could dwarf the stock and bond market. Summers persuaded her to back off. When the Meltdown of 2008 hit, the huge derivative exposure of the large banks and some insurance companies was so great that it was one of the major causes for the meltdown of the entire banking system. Summers, normally a great economist not only called this one wrong, but later, along with most other government and private economists ignored a very explicit warning—See {637168}, {637986}, and {620038}.
The great scholars were as wrong as everyone else about the Great Depression
When the Meltdown hit America, the crisis drew attention to the fiscal solvency and stability of banks in most of the world. The Irish banks were much more overextended than those of most counties and when that came to light there was a bank panic in Ireland. Ahern and the Irish Dail (parliament) decided to bail out the Irish bank at a very great cost to the rest of the Irish economy and people. He believed if Lehman Brothers had been bailed out, as America did with other institutions, the Irish bank bubble would not have burst. It is not known whether he actually meant to use the word “testicles” or he made a gaff intending to use the word “tentacles”. Both have relevant meaning in the situation with a significant shade of difference in meaning between the two.
The savings and loan crises became clear shortly thereafter.
Carney was a Canadian. Under a quirk of British law, the Governor of the Bank of England need not be a British citizen so long as he is a citizen of a Country of the British Empire.
He was replying to Senator Grassley--{637990}. This quotation is one of the saddest admissions in American law enforcement and corporate regulatory history. A small group of very wealthy men, working for huge financial corporations caused the worst financial crisis since the Great Depression. The Government regulators were reined in by the Bush Presidential administration and were none to competent anyway. The Clinton Administration repealed the Glass Stiegel Act allowing banks to gamble with customer’s The Congress made matters worse by kowtowing to the housing and real estate special interests and overheating the housing market. But with all that some of the many of the financial executives committed crimes ranging from financial fraud to forgery of court documents. But they had put the country into such a poor economic state, that the Obama administration feared that prosecution of some of the leading financial executive criminals would spook the financial markets and cause an even greater economic situation. At least the Attorney General admitted the truth of Senator Grassley’s suspicion--{637990}.
Banks often lie. The system encourages them to do so. In a crisis, if a bank honestly says that it is not sure that it has enough cash and other liquid assets, others will not lend it any more money and depositors will rush to withdraw their money, thereby almost insuring a failure. The bank that lies, might weather the storm and survive.
At this time it was 6 years after the Home Financing Crisis and the Meltdown of 2008 and despite tens of thousands of law violations by the bank, the Justice Department was finally finishing their investigations and requiring some penalties. Other negotiations with other banks were in progress, but no bank executives were going to jail for the millions they handled fraudulently, whereas a burglar who stole household goods would do jail time.
He was speaking for the Bush Administration. He was another regulation-opposed appointee of the George W. Bush Administration. He killed many regulations that had been developed to better regulate the banks and the mortgage industry to stop many of the obvious abuses of the industry. With few regulations in place, despite warnings such as {638024}, what had been greedy and dangerous practices of a minority of the industry became the vast majority when the bubble burst in the Meltdown. Note the rhetorical device of using “regulatory intrusion” rather than “regulation” or “more regulation”. This reflected an extreme conservative view that all regulation is bad – an “intrusion”, while most conservatives want a reasonable degree of regulation and not the elimination of all regulation.
Martin Stuart Feldstein was an American economist. He was the George F. Baker Professor of Economics at Harvard University, and the president emeritus of the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER). He served as President and Chief Executive Officer of the NBER from 1978 through 2008 (with the exception of 1982 to 1984). From 1982 to 1984, Feldstein served as chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers and as chief economic advisor to President Ronald Reagan (where his deficit hawk views clashed with Reagan administration large military expenditure policies). He was also a member of the Washington-based financial advisory body the Group of Thirty from 2003.