THOMAS SCHELLING

Knowing what an opponent values is a necessary condition for deterrence success.

I sometimes wish we could have, over the next five or ten years, a lot of horrid things happening-you know, like tornadoes in the Midwest and so forth-that would get people very concerned about climate change.

Nobody is going to give away the farm in Kyoto. It is not anybody's to give away. And even if the United States Senate would actually ratify a bad treaty, anything called for under the treaty would require legislation passed through both houses.

When I used to theorize about a nuclear standoff, I didn't really have to understand what was happening inside the Soviet Union. It is a lot harder now to build a theory that can encompass all the complications of today's conflicts.

There is a tendency in our planning to confuse the unfamiliar with the improbable.

Threats must be credible if they are to influence the behavior of other states.

There are two things that are very expensive in international relations: promises when they succeed and threats when they fail

I use game theory to help myself understand conflict situations and opportunities.

Threats must be credible if they are to influence the behavior of other states.

There are two things that are very expensive in international relations: promises when they succeed and threats when they fail

Knowing what an opponent values is a necessary condition for deterrence success.

I sometimes wish we could have, over the next five or ten years, a lot of horrid things happening-you know, like tornadoes in the Midwest and so forth-that would get people very concerned about climate change.

Nobody is going to give away the farm in Kyoto. It is not anybody's to give away. And even if the United States Senate would actually ratify a bad treaty, anything called for under the treaty would require legislation passed through both houses.

There is a tendency in our planning to confuse the unfamiliar with the improbable.

I use game theory to help myself understand conflict situations and opportunities.

When I used to theorize about a nuclear standoff, I didn't really have to understand what was happening inside the Soviet Union. It is a lot harder now to build a theory that can encompass all the complications of today's conflicts.