Asymmetric Information Quotes

I think what IBM is excellent at is using their sales and marketing infrastructure to convince people who have asymmetrically less knowledge to pay for something.

In general, signalling theory says that if you have a good way of proving something and a noisy way of proving something, and you choose the noisy way, that means chances are it's because you couldn't do the good way in the first place.

We must know more about our adversaries than they know about us.

Having information that the other side doesn't have gives VCs an advantage... they take advantage of entrepreneurs who haven't been through this before... they were totally willing to take advantage of us.

Suppliers and especially manufacturers have market power because they have information about a product or a service that the customer does not and cannot have, and does not need if he can trust the brand. This explains the profitability of brands.

They [free market policies] were never based on solid empirical and theoretical foundations, and even as many of these policies were being pushed, academic economists were explaining the limitations of markets for instance, whenever information is imperfect, which is to say always.

It all depends on the robber's knowledge of the loser's knowledge of the robber. - Daupin

I love the characters not knowing everything and the reader knowing more than them. There's more mischief in that and more room for seriousness, too.

The 1970s was the decade of developments in the new area of information economics. Search theory, which emphasized the need to gather information, was joined by models that featured asymmetric information, the case in which information differed across individual agents.

If you know your life chances are greatly reduced, should you be in a position to take out life insurance if that knowledge is not available to the insurers?

If every player is on the left, and I am on the right, you need to trust me that I have seen something the other players have not seen.

In 1963 and later papers, I pointed out that the special market characteristics of medical care and medical insurance could be explained by reference to differences in information among the parties involved.

Capital markets reward you for what you learn that other people have yet to ascertain.