Ro Khanna Quotes

Vigilant and effective antitrust enforcement today is preferable to the heavy hand of government regulation of the Internet tomorrow.

We need to use antitrust laws. You know, we need to create real media again.

My current goal is to change the way we think about antitrust and anti-monopoly.

Amazon is not a monopoly or a monopsony, and even if it were, that by itself isn't illegal.

Like other antitrust agencies we make our assessment of a merger or antitrust case based on its impact on our jurisdiction, and not on the nationality of the companies. This is exactly what the U.S. antitrust agencies, the Justice Department and the FTC, do.

I think the touchstone is to give consumers a full, fair choice without the power of a monopoly operating system pushing them in a direction that free competition might or might not achieve.

Our participation in the single market, and our ability to help set its rules is the principal reason for our membership of the EU. So it is a vital interest for us to protect the integrity and fairness of the single market for all its members.

In Europe, we have three tools when it comes to fair competition. One is antitrust, one is merger control, and the third is state aid control. And the third you don't have in the States.

Consumers depend on us to make sure that competition is fair and open, and it's my responsibility to make that happen.

This is probably going to surprise people, but if you were to do a scan around the globe on public policy concerning our industry, you would probably have to conclude that the United States has the policy that has been, I believe, the most pro competition.

I have a very strong tool in competitional enforcement: To do merger control, to look into cartels, misuse of dominant position - when member states hand out favors, for instance, in terms of tax breaks. But even though that's a strong tool, it cannot solve everything.

As attorney general, I would work with my colleagues in other states to launch a major antitrust investigation to look into the ways in which Facebook and Google are wielding and may be abusing their duopoly powers.

I think we need to have stronger antitrust enforcement.

Who can complain about the price that Google is charging you? Or who can complain about Amazon's prices; they are simply lower than the competition's. And that's why I think we need to shift back to a more Brandeisian conception of antitrust, where we consider values other than simply efficiency and low prices.

I'm for strong antitrust enforcement.

While control is needed, and perfectly warranted, our bias should be clear up front: Monopolies are not justified by theory; they should be permitted only when justified by facts. If there is no solid basis for extending a certain monopoly protection, then we should not extend that protection.

The concept of free competition enforced by law is a grotesque contradiction in terms.

The railroads saw that they must either accept control by the State of control the State.

All the authorities agree that in order to vitiate a contract or combination it is not essential that its result should be a complete monopoly; it is sufficient if it really tends to that end and to deprive the public of the advantages which flow from free competition.

We seek the definite end of preventing combinations in furtherance of monopoly and in restraint of trade

… businessmen must compete, but no one may win the competition. It is this aspect of antitrust which creates two standards, one for big business, another for small business. No matter how vicious the competition of the little fellow, the big fellow must not countercompete too hard.

Regulation is often a way to keep a dominant firm in place.

The first is determining how to deal with the great industrial combinations is knowledge of the facts—publicity.

More and more it is evident that the State and if necessary the Nation, has got to possess the right of supervision and control as regards the great corporations.

A study by the Federal Trade Commission found that concerns about every vertical merger examined by the commission from 2006 to 2012 were resolved through 'conduct remedies' rather than divestitures, and that all these remedies had been successful at protecting competition.