Carol Loomis Quotes


In the 1987 stock market crash, according to the conclusions of the official Brady report, colossal sales of stock index futures by so-called portfolio insurers - whose investment strategies depended entirely on these derivatives - greatly exacerbated the 500-point market decline.


Citations

Loomis, Carol J. "The Risk That Won't Go Away." Fortune, Time Inc., 7 Mar. 1994.

Related Quotes

U. S. Treasury Secretary Larry Summers called Rajan a “Luddite” for this view, but what Rajan observed and predicted was exactly what happened in the Meltdown of 2008 which led to the Great Recession. Rajan was one of the few economists to call this right. Several, invested their own money assuming a crash and made billions. Most, like Summers and the Federal Reserve Chairmen in retrospect admitted that they missed the signs and didn’t connect the dots. See {637168}, {637987}, and {620038}


When the Meltdown hit America, the crisis drew attention to the fiscal solvency and stability of banks in most of the world. The Irish banks were much more overextended than those of most counties and when that came to light there was a bank panic in Ireland. Ahern and the Irish Dail (parliament) decided to bail out the Irish bank at a very great cost to the rest of the Irish economy and people. He believed if Lehman Brothers had been bailed out, as America did with other institutions, the Irish bank bubble would not have burst. It is not known whether he actually meant to use the word “testicles” or he made a gaff intending to use the word “tentacles”. Both have relevant meaning in the situation with a significant shade of difference in meaning between the two.


She had warned about the unregulated derivatives 10 years earlier, but to no avail. See {637987}. Then when she had been proven prescient in the Meltdown of 2008, Congress was more interested in how she thought they could prevent future problems with derivatives. Some were adopted but not all. The financial institutions claimed that they needed derivatives to hedge positions and hence “stabilize” the system. Of the members of Congress who voted on this issue, almost none understood derivatives and credit default swaps were and how they worked. But some were sure they were bad, and others were sure that they were necessary for stability. Derivatives can, and did, get so complicated that the people who originally created them sometimes cannot tell whether they are at risk or not. Even computer cannot calculate the value and risks of these instruments because the values and risks depend on what happens to other companies or instruments which themselves have derivatives insuring them. See {620038} for a good description of the difficulty.


Born thought that her agency was responsible for regulating the new esoteric financial products—derivatives including credit default swaps—for otherwise there would be no regulation at all of financial products that could dwarf the stock and bond market. Summers persuaded her to back off. When the Meltdown of 2008 hit, the huge derivative exposure of the large banks and some insurance companies was so great that it was one of the major causes for the meltdown of the entire banking system. Summers, normally a great economist not only called this one wrong, but later, along with most other government and private economists ignored a very explicit warning—See {637168}, {637986}, and {620038}.


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  • Born: June 25, 1929
  • Nationality: American
  • Profession: Journalist Retired Senior Editor-at-large At Fortune

Carol Junge Loomis is an American financial journalist, who retired in 2014 as senior editor-at-large at Fortune magazine.