Leonid Brezhnev Quotes

Israel has a sizeable nuclear arsenal and could retaliate if it were attacked.

This means that the only function of nuclear weapons, while they exist, is to deter a nuclear attack.

I could not conceive of any President engaging in all-out nuclear war unless we were in danger of all-out devastation ourselves.

It is essential that we maintain the capability at all times to inflict an unacceptable level of damage on the Soviet Union, including the destruction of 200 major Soviet cities.

Massive [nuclear] retaliation: The policy under which, if "they" began the war, you could take satisfaction, in the instant of being vaporized or cooked, in the knowledge that "our" planes and guided missiles are going to do the same thing to "them" in a few minutes. If "we" started the war, massive retaliation would be what was vaporizing or cooking you.

The aggressor too should know that the preemptive use of nuclear weapons would not insure victory. With modern detection systems and the combat readiness of the Soviet Union's strategic nuclear forces, the United States would not be able to deal a crippling blow to the socialist countries. The aggressor will not be able to evade an all-crushing retaliatory strike

There will never be a nuclear war; there's too much real estate involved.

The Americans have surrounded our country with military bases and threatened us with nuclear weapons, and now they will learn just what it feels like to have enemy missiles pointed at you; we'd be doing nothing more than giving them a little of their own medicine.

It is madness for any country to build its policy with an eye to nuclear war.

I would not recommend the use of any atomic weapon, no matter how small, when both sides have the power to destroy the world.

The notion that our only strategic choice is MAD (mutually assured destruction)—which means nothing less than an unstable pact to commit instant and total mutual suicide in the event of war—is irrational, immoral and unnecessary.

Is it my duty in my last official moment on the face of the Earth to launch this massive retaliatory strike.

I will not rest until I take Athens and burned it to the ground.

We must not force an adversary into a choice between humiliating defeat and nuclear war.

The Golden Nuclear Rule: Do unto others if they would do unto you.

For decades, we and the Soviets have lived under the threat of mutual assured destruction; if either resorted to the use of nuclear weapons, the other could retaliate and destroy the one who had started it. Is there either logic or morality in believing that if one side threatens to kill tens of millions of our people, our only recourse is to threaten killing tens of millions of theirs?

To launch weapons against a nuclear power would be suicide. To do so against a non-nuclear enemy would be militarily unnecessary, morally repugnant, and politically indefensible.

In the Cuban missile crisis [1962] we had 5,000 nuclear strategic weapons and the Russians had only 300.... Even though we had a 17 to 1 advantage, we were deterred. Even if only ten percent of their missiles got through, tens of millions of Americans would have died. We could not use our nuclear superiority.

Even when deterrence is appropriate, it might not work—for example against an enemy who is suicidal or invulnerable to a counterattack.

Maintaining a U. S. Nuclear Arsenal presents only one benefit today: deterring the use of nuclear weapons by others. Thus, there is simply no reason for nuclear weapons to play a central role in U. S. Defense Policy any longer.

The atomic clock ticks faster and faster. We may anticipate a state of affairs in which the Great Powers will each be in a position to put an end to the civilization and life of the other, though not without risking its own. We may be likened to two scorpions in a bottle, each capable of killing the other but only at risk of his own life.

Nuclear weapons are only good for deterring. It is insane that two men, sitting on opposite ends of the world, should be able to decide to bring an end to civilization.

One significant indication of the effectiveness of deterrence is that the Soviet Union and the United States share the belief that a nuclear war would begin only out of desperation or inadvertence. A weakening of deterrence could increase the possibility of a calculated “voluntary” war or worse.

The whole idea of deterrence is to convince your enemy that you are willing and able to make it so painful for them to continue on a threatening or bellicose course that they change their behavior.

By God, war is not an option for two nuclear countries.