Antoine Henri Jomini Quotes

The end and aim of spying in all its five varieties is knowledge of the enemy; and this knowledge can only be derived, in the first instance, from the converted spy. Hence it is essential that the converted spy be treated with the utmost liberality.

They [spies] cannot be properly managed without benevolence and straightforwardness.

I got nothing. Even the spies I'm spying on who are spying on other spies got nothing.

The danger of having the military take over intelligence is that the military has a very different perspective on the world.

We learned the value of research in World War II.

'The Man Who Never Was,' by Ewen Montagu, remains the best book about wartime espionage written by an active participant - incomplete, and dry in parts, it nonetheless summons up the ingenuity and sheer eccentricity of those who played this strange and dangerous game.

It is only the enlightened ruler and the wise general who will use the highest intelligence of the army for the purposes of spying, and thereby they achieve great results.

The Cox Report documents a systematic, well-planned effort by the Chinese military at the highest levels to target and acquire technology for military modernization.

Week after week, the heads of Red Army Intelligence received updates on the Wehrmacht's preparations.

Now the reason the enlightened prince and the wise general conquer the enemy whenever they move and their achievements surpass those of ordinary men is foreknowledge.

My name is E. Howard Hunt. I'm currently retired from more than 22 years in the profession of espionage.

Fighting wars is not so much about killing people as it is about finding things out. The more you know, the more likely you are to win a battle.

In a global and totalitarian war, intelligence must be global and totalitarian.

I am unable to tell a quarter of a billion Americans what we are doing on their behalf, because if I did, it would become the table of contents of the training manual of the enemy.

Intelligence isn’t just something for the Cold War. When you think of Pearl Harbor, you can understand why. Unpleasant surprises are out there.

I do not see Japanese invasion of the Philippines as a probability because the hazards would be too great for the Japanese .... We know a great deal that the Japanese are not aware we know, and we are familiar with their plans to a certain extent ... .

The only situation a commander can know fully is his own: his opponent's he can know only from unreliable intelligence.

No one demands more caution than a spy, and when someone has the skeleton key to minds, counter him by leaving the key of caution inside, on the other side of the keyhole.

The trouble is, when professional spies go out of their way to make a definitive statement about one of their own, the public tends to believe the opposite: which puts us all back where we started.

Spies are a most important element in water, because on them depends an army's ability to move.

By 'intelligence' we mean every sort of information about the enemy and his country - the basis, in short, of our own plans and operations.

You bomb ISIL. You're not trying to bomb innocent people. And that requires intelligence and confidence in our military to be able to develop the kinds of targets that we need. We're already doing Special Forces, who are going to help us gather that intelligence and help advise and assist and train local forces so that they can go after ISIL in areas like Raqqah and Mosul.

The surprise of an army is now next to an impossibility. ... Prearranged surprises are rare and difficult because in order to plan one it becomes necessary to have an accurate knowledge of the enemy's camp.

Signs cannot be represented, in a spy's report, so damningly as words.

The way the United States intelligence community operates is it doesn't limit itself to the protection of the homeland. It doesn't limit itself to countering terrorist threats, countering nuclear proliferation. It's also used for economic espionage, for political spying to gain some knowledge of what other countries are doing.