Daniel Kahneman Quotes

I had made a mistake in presuming that the self interests of the organizations of organizations, specifically banks and others, were such that they were best capable of protecting their own shareholders and their equity in the firms.

American business would be run better today if there was more alignment between CEOs' interest and the company. For example, would the financial crisis of 2008 have occurred if the CEO of Lehman and Morgan Stanley and Goldman and Citibank had to take a very small percentage of every mortgage-backed security... or every loan they made?

The good parts about being a public company are increased discipline, increased execution and increased transparency to make sure that you are really building a company for a hundred years.

It is very clear for us; we will do whatever is in the best interest of Shriram shareholders.

JP Morgan always has higher capital liquidity, that is partially to make up for mistakes and problems and obviously it's a tough economy. We support an oversight committee, we supported some of the compensation, new compensation rules, though we already follow most of them. We support a lot of it.

I do believe that banks are special - they are very leveraged institutions by nature; therefore, it's even more critical to ensure that the governance and the process of running a banking company are well-organised, managed and regulated.

What we're going to do is redouble our efforts on financial regulatory reform, because that has in it sensible things like say on pay, so at least the shareholders are minding the store, sensible things like saying, for heaven's sakes, compensation should be focused on - on long term, so that you don't have rewards for short-term risk-taking.

A lot of deals are done or not done because chief executives are not fully aligned to shareholders.

The ultimate arbiters of the models of banking and the management of banking are the investors. It's the shareholders.

We're all shareholders. These guys below me, they see the CEO taking it easy, it's their money.

We've got some real greedy hogs who own no interest in the company they're running, whose sole interest is in whatever it takes to be able to get to the point to fly out on their golden parachute and milk the shareholder and take risks that they shouldn't take.

The history of business has shown that companies usually only regulate themselves if they're forced to by legislation, or out of self-interest - often in the shape of a marketable message that will help sell more products.

Banks need to have large shareholders on the board that have a direct interest in their performance.

The financial crisis is a stark reminder that transparency and disclosure are essential in today's marketplace.

I don't want to take a company public and not have it do extremely well and fail the public shareholder.

The real mechanism for corporate governance is the active involvement of the owners.

Clearly as you move to being a public company, probably even more than growth, there is a huge value based on predictability.

Self-dealing, essentially, occurs when managers run companies to line their own pockets instead of those of the companies' owners. It's been a perennial problem in American capitalism and became a real dilemma when America moved toward a model in which corporations would be run by professional managers who had only small ownership stakes.

If you're going to run a public company, be absolutely certain of what the parameters are, what the clarity is, that you can explain it to yourselves and explain it externally.

Look, I've always said from the word go many years ago that I felt the whole bonus culture, they need to think very carefully about being detached from the rest of the British public.

You can demonize Goldman Sachs all you want, and I'm sure there are reasons to do it. But the real pressure is all of us pressuring the companies for stock returns, and that leads to all kinds of decisions.

The regulators can’t do it. These institutions are just too large and complex.

Companies … have a broader mandate than apparently the reformers want to give them in the political sphere. It is not only maximizing profits. It is advancing the economic interests of the corporation in many different ways.

Directors should be paid for promising impossible things.

As a pro-business Democrat, I understand the obligations of publicly traded companies to maximize returns to shareholders.