Condoleezza Rice Quotes

After the Russian army invaded the nation of Georgia, Senator Obama's reaction was one of moral indecision and equivalence, the kind of response that would only encourage Russia's Putin to invade Ukraine next.

I would like to see Russia not invade Ukraine or put pressure on and threaten Baltic states. But we live in the real and existing world.

For the Kremlin, it is more feasible to preserve its great-power status in cooperation with the United States than in confrontation.

American presence is, you know, the major cause of balance of power and the stability in this region.

It's essential for the U.S. and Europe to prevent Putin from going farther and reversing the hard-won independence of former Soviet republics.

If Americans are entitled to hit Iraq unilaterally, then why isn't Russia entitled to the same with respect to Georgia? Why is China not entitled to the same with respect to some other neighboring country which, according to Chinese views, may be supporting insurrection in Tibet or Shenyang? Why, say, India is not entitled to hit Pakistan, which openly supports terrorists in Kashmir and which has nuclear weapons, and which has a very fragile domestic situation under which fundamentalists any day can come to power

Anybody who says it is in America's interest to not have better relations with Russia doesn't know what they're talking about when it comes to geopolitics.

We live in a dangerous world, and Russia has not complied with existing treaties.

I don't worry about superpower confrontation. You know, I lived through the Cold War days, and where everybody was worried about a Soviet Union armed to the teeth. I think we're going to get along fine with Russia, and I don't see them as internationally ambitious.

I don't believe that Russia's a threat for Europe. I think that's a big scam.

It's more of a strength model to say that [Vladimir] Putin will do what it takes to defend his country. But that's why Putin is dangerous and Russia is a major cause of concern for us .

On issues like Ukraine, on issues like Syria, we've had very significant differences [with Russia].

Today, it is imperative to end this hysteria, to refute the rhetoric of the Cold War and to accept the obvious fact: Russia is an independent, active participant in international affairs. Like other countries, it has its own national interests that need to be taken into account and respected.

No nation should stoke instability in its neighbor's country.

From time to time, the irresponsible acts of the Cuban government remind us that this is far more than about the freedom of one country, but it really is about the stability and security of the region and the national security interests of the United States.

There's a tendency on the part of Americans, all of us, to say, 'Hey, the Cold War is over, the Soviet Union is gone, we don't have to worry about these guys again.' We always have to be worried about them, we always have to be concerned about them, and we have to be well-informed.

Of course the United States and Russia have different interests. Nevertheless, both are strategic partners.

Other than being crazy enough to press a button, there is nothing that Putin can do militarily to fundamentally alter American interests.

Long term I do believe internationally there is a huge misunderstanding of Russia.

President Obama hasn't been elected by the American people in order to be pleasant to Russia.

You can't give Russia the right to interfere with the internal affairs of counties in its area.... You have to drive up the cost to Russia for aggression.

That's the problem with Russia: The world has changed. Europe is not at war, and no one wants to negotiate with us. The world has changed, but Russia prefers to pretend it has not.

It’s not in our interest to drive the Russians into a beleaguered attitude where they have to prove what they can do.

If Russia and the United States approach each other in starkly adversarial terms, the conflict will badly warp the foreign policy of both countries ...

Anti-Western resentment and Russian patriotism appear particularly pronounced in Putin’s personality and life experiences, but a different Russian government not run by former KGB types would still be confronted with the challenge of weakness vis-à-vis the West and the desire for a special role in the world. Russia’s foreign policy orientation, in other words, is as much a condition as a choice. But if Russian elites could somehow redefine their sense of exceptionalism and put aside their unwinnable competition with the West, they could set their country on a less costly, more promising course.