Ferdinand Marcos Quotes

The United States has become geopolitically hobbled seemingly interested in grand strategic initiatives or transformative diplomacy, as its attention constantly dances from one crisis to another.

The doctrine of preemption has a long and distinguished history in the history of American foreign policy.

If Russia and the United States approach each other in starkly adversarial terms, the conflict will badly warp the foreign policy of both countries ...

We must effectively counter Moscow's attempts at influence with American strength and resolve, certainly not with a weak approach to President Putin or with any relief from sanctions.

There is an increasing demand that the president and Secretary Hull get rid of the unteachable group in the State Department of men who have not learned, after ten years of experience, that appeasement has never worked anywhere, at any time.

Even if you have presidents like FDR dealing with someone like Stalin, with whom he didn't exactly all the time disagree... He wasn't always in lockstep saying Stalin was wonderful all the time. Donald Trump never criticizes Putin.

You just hope that we haven't soured an entire generation on the necessity, from time to time, of using force because Iraq has been such a debacle. That would be tragic because Iran is a grave threat.

For the Russians, frankly, it's time that we punched the Russians in the nose. They've gotten away with too much in this world and we need to stand up against them, not just there, but also in Eastern Europe where they threaten some of our most precious allies.

Both Bibi and Obama realize that they are going to have to face the problem of Iran together.

Diplomacy is not an end in itself if it does not advance U.S. interests.

I have spent time discussing the American political system and current events in Taiwan with the junior diplomats, and they have repeatedly expressed their country's desire to avoid confrontation with China.

American presence is, you know, the major cause of balance of power and the stability in this region.

The U.S. engages with North Korea, so I don't see why they can't engage with Iran.

I was studying International Relations at Columbia when 9/11 happened, and it made me want understand the security dynamics of the world. I had been more focused on soft power issues - understanding different cultures and such - but once 9/11 happened, I felt like I didn't know anything about security problems.

We must use all the tools of American power in resolving disputes, including diplomacy. And we must have sufficient congressional debate and oversight before ever putting another U.S. solider in harm's way.

It is no exaggeration to say that Syria holds the key for nearly all of America's foreign policy goals in the Middle East. As Syria goes, so goes the region.

Many agree that the worst thing that could ever happen is if Russia and China get closer.

More than four decades after Nixon met Mao, the relationship between the U.S. and China has reached a pivotal moment. To date, even as China has become more powerful and present in our lives, Americans have generally found it to be an unsatisfying 'enemy.'

This fact lays on us - so long as the maintenance of good relations with Russia seems to us worth an effort - the duty of satisfying Russia that she has no need to fear any invasion of her sphere of interests on Germany's part.

The United States has dealt with the Middle East and surrounding regions for many decades in the context of the Cold War.

Historically, defense spending cuts have preceded increased international turmoil as America's global enemies sense a failure of will.

The reason that Americans have not been able to see the great strategic benefit that could accrue from a closer relationship with Iran is emotion.

The State Department desperately needs to be vigorously harnessed. It has too big a role to play in the formulation of foreign policy, and foreign policy is too important to be left up to foreign service officers.

The United States has been unable to create a post-Cold War security architecture in which Russia feels it has a stake.

Our public dealings with the Russians can hardly lead to any clear and satisfactory results unless they are preceded by preparatory discussions of the most secret and delicate nature.