Louis Freeh Quotes

We all love privacy. We all care about public safety. And none of - at least people that I hang around with, none of us want back doors. We don't want access to devices built-in in some way.

The solution to government surveillance is to encrypt everything.

The intelligence community, in particular the FBI, have been sounding alarms about this for more than a year. So to argue that suddenly we have to do this because of the San Bernardino case doesn't really pass the straight-face test. I mean, they've been talking about this. And to say, well, it will only apply to this case, that just - that doesn't wash. This is a major piece of public policy.

The use of encrypted communication and data storage to shield terrorist coordination from intelligence and law-enforcement authorities is known as 'going dark.'

I believe that if you took privacy and you said, I'm willing to give up all of my privacy to be secure. So you weighted it as a zero. My own view is that encryption is a much better, much better world. And I'm not the only person that thinks that.

First, the security and privacy of sensitive taxpayer information is absolutely essential.

Without strong encryption, you will be spied on systematically by lots of people.

There are two types of encryption: one that will prevent your sister from reading your diary and one that will prevent your government.

The most important impact of technology on communications security is that it draws better and better traffic into vulnerable channels.

There are two kinds of cryptography in this world: cryptography that will stop your kid sister from reading your files, and cryptography that will stop major governments from reading your files.

The problem of end-to-end encryption isn't just a terrorism issue.

If we start - premise that the information is mine, and we give the individual's rights, we worry about what happens during a breach. If you try to protect access to it, as opposed to not even making it available, you have less to worry about who will break the wall.

On the question of information security, he claims that, in a Trump Administration, the U.S. government will not spy on its own citizens. If true, this would represent a turn away from the strong language that he has used about identifying terrorists on our soil.

You know the interesting thing about encryption is that it cannot be secure just for some people.

The No. 1 reason for me to support and help launch Telegram was to build a means of communication that can't be accessed by the Russian security agencies, so I can talk about it for hours.

The Apple imperative is to build a system that is 100 per cent resistant to any government warrant. The data on your iPhone, no matter how swarmy, corrupt, or dangerous you are, is supposedly safe. That's also the proposition of Panamanian banking laws.

I'm not targeting government. I'm not saying hey, I'm closing it because I don't want to give you any data. I'm saying that to protect out customers, we have to encrypt. And a side affect of that is, I don't have the data.

The US government still has no idea what documents I have because encryption works

By leaning on companies, by leaning on infrastructure providers, by leaning on researchers, graduate students, post-docs, even undergrads, to look at the challenges having an untrusted internet, where we have to put our communications on wires that are owned by a phone company that we can't trust, that's working in collaboration with a government that we can't trust, in areas around the world, we can restructure that communications fabric in a way that it's encrypted.

There is a big problem. It's called encryption. And the people in San Bernardino were communicating with people who the FBI had been watching. But because their phone was encrypted, because the intelligence officials could not see who they were talking to, it was lost.

The Cheney team had, for example, technological supremacy over the National Security Council staff. That is to say, they could read their e-mails. I remember one particular member of the N.S.C. staff wouldn't use e-mail because he knew they were reading it. He did a test case, kind of like the Midway battle, when we'd broken the Japanese code. He thought he'' broken the code, so he sent a test e-mail out that he knew would rile Scooter [Libby], and within an hour Scooter was in his office.

If you find a node that you can penetrate, that you can eliminate, and draw more information for future operations, I think it's prudent to do.

I'm a woman in technology, I think that we have to consider our border and use the technology we have to be sure that we secure it. If you build a six foot wall, somebody may jump eight feet. But, maybe there's surveillance... there's many high tech things that we can use to be sure we are protecting our borders.

After the investigation of Operation Aurora, the cyberattack on Google from within China that was revealed in 2010, I realized a completely new type of security strategy and technology was needed.

While encryption protects against cyberattacks, deploying it in warrant-proof form jeopardizes public safety more generally.