David Kay Quotes
And like I say, I think we've got other cases other than Iraq. I do not think the problem of global proliferation of weapons technology of mass destruction is going to go away, and that's why I think it is an urgent issue.
Kay, David. Testimony. Iraqi Weapons of Mass Destruction and Related Programs, United States Senate Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Government Printing Office, 28 Jan. 2004.
The background of the statement was Iraq and Saddam Hussein.
This quotation represents a colossal failure of politicians to understand science and the way that it works. They assumed that the processes and methods were secrets that if kept secret, would prevent others from constructing an atomic bomb. The reality was that the most important “secrets” had emanated from Einstein’s Theory of Relativity and other published scientific papers. So any competent physicist knew immediately how the bomb worked. A triggering mechanism would need to be developed but that was just a complicated engineering project. The largest barrier was the supply of enough radioactive material with sufficient purity. That then (as today) took a lot of money and some time. But after the initial bomb, the secrets might speed things up but were not necessary. That is why the French and the Russians quickly developed their bombs, and why it did not take the Israelis long once the had decided to invest the resources. China, India and Pakistan did not need the secrets either when much later, they decided to develop nuclear weapons. With the atomic bomb, spying and obtaining secrets shorten the required time and reduce the cost, but are not necessary. This is why nuclear proliferation is so hard to stop.
David A. Kay (born c. 1940) is a weapons expert, political commentator, and senior fellow at the Potomac Institute for Policy Studies. He is best known for his time as United Nations Chief Weapons Inspector following the first Gulf War and for leading of the Iraq Survey Group's search for weapons of mass destruction following the 2003 invasion of Iraq. Upon presentation of the Group's finding that there had been significant errors in pre-war intelligence concerning Iraq's weapons programs, Kay resigned. The ensuing controversy served as impetus for the formation of the Iraq Intelligence Commission.