Sir Frederick Pollock, 3rd Baronet Quotes

It turns out that we can build perfectly secure software, and yet people can still get hurt.

Prolific programmers contribute to certain disaster.

At the time the Sendmail program had a very poor reputation with respect to security, with four root vulnerabilities per year for two successive years.

I use Mac. Not because it's more secure than everything else - because it is actually less secure than Windows - but I use it because it is still under the radar. People who write malicious code want the greatest return on their investment, so they target Windows systems. I still work with Windows in virtual machines.

I'm a really good hacker, but I'm not a sensible person.

I don't understand technology, and I'm very scared of it.

No amount of source-level verification or scrutiny will protect you from using untrusted code.

There is no such thing as perfect security, only varying levels of insecurity.

It's simply unrealistic to depend on secrecy for security in computer software. You may be able to keep the exact workings of the program out of general circulation, but can you prevent the code from being reverse-engineered by serious opponents? Probably not. The secret to strong security: less reliance on secrets.

At the end of the day, my goal was to be the best hacker.

All software sucks.

In terms of dangers, such as viruses, fraud or identity theft, I don't think we were thinking about that at all when we got started. If we had been worried about that, the net might have been better today, but we might not have even got there.

The more sophisticated we get, the more advanced our buildings and vehicles become, the more vulnerable we are.

If you think technology can solve your security problems, then you don't understand the problems and you don't understand the technology.

The Y2K problem is not caused by technical limitations. We simply forgot to think of the problem.

We can't defend French culture without a [computer] software industry.

This is not a case about one isolated iPhone. Rather, this case is about the Department of Justice and the FBI seeking through the courts a dangerous power that Congress and the American people have withheld: the ability to force companies like Apple to undermine the basic security and privacy interests of hundreds of millions of individuals around the globe. The government demands that Apple create a back door to defeat the encryption on the iPhone, making its user’s most confidential and personal information vulnerable to hackers, identify thieves, hostile foreign agents, and unwarranted government surveillance.

Efforts to constrain encryption through forms of extraordinary access will inevitably introduce vulnerabilities into the security of consumer products in ways that are likely to have adverse long-term effects on the security, privacy, and civil liberties of citizens.

National security always matters, obviously. But the reality is that if you have an open door in your software for the good guys, the bad guys get in there, too.

I cannot conceive of how more than 1% of us could possibly survive a cyberwar.

Great software has seemingly limitless potential to solve human problems - and it can spread around the world in the blink of an eye. Malicious code moves just as quickly, and when software is created for the wrong reason, it has a huge and growing capacity to harm millions of people.

Technology companies have a front-line responsibility to secure their own networks, products, and platforms.

Security is an endless race - one that you can lead but never decisively win. Yesterday's best defenses cannot fend off the attacks of today or tomorrow.

Accidental stacks considered harmful.

Security used to be an inconvenience sometimes, but now it's a necessity all the time.