Lee Hsien Loong Quotes

An International Congress [Summit]: the greatest of all Vanity Fairs …. Each Prime Minister thinks that he alone is capable of representing his country’s policy. Each Foreign Secretary thinks that the Premier knows nothing of diplomacy. Each professional ambassador thinks the same about his Foreign Secretary …. It is an orchestra of first violins.

… international politics has always been a ruthless and dangerous business, and it is likely to remain that way.

I am somebody who respects Putin highly, but I'm not somebody who is against America.

America likes you only if you're on the side she selects. If you don't go along with her totally, you're automatically considered to have entered the Soviet bloc.

To avoid entangling alliances has been a maxim of our policy ever since the days of Washington, and its wisdom no one will attempt to dispute.

I was fourteen when Kissinger made his secret trip to China, and then there was subsequently Nixon's trip to China, and I was very much seized with an interest in China.

President Nixon was a pragmatic strategist. He would engage, not contain, China, but he would also quietly set pieces into place for a fallback position should China not play according to the rules as a good global citizen.

Western States keep playing with, and around, Russia.

The United States can tell you all about what's wrong with the British, to say nothing of the Russians.

I remain committed to a balanced policy, which will protect our national interests both on our eastern border - I mean with Russia - and of course with the European Union.

John Foster Dulles had called on me in his capacity as Secretary of State, and he had exhausted every argument to persuade me to place Cambodia under the protection of the South East Asia Treaty Organization.

Much of our national debate proceeds as if China and America were locked in a zero-sum game in which one's loss is precisely the other's gain.

The history of nations shows that words are not always immediately followed by action.

A great amount has been talked and written about what constitutes a sufficient balance and what really is meant by the concepts of 'balance' and 'deterrence'.

Since the end of the Cold War, hegemonism has become increasingly unpopular.

The way politics divides the world is into friend and enemy.

Globalization, far from putting an end to power diplomacy between States, has, on the contrary, intensified it.

The artificial separation of politics and culture is nowhere more pronounced than in the discourse of foreign policy and international affairs.

Many in China find it perplexing that the U.S. and Russian perceptions are still so heavily influenced by the Cold War.

Most of them are military commanders, country notables and landowners, and educated people. It is inconceivable that such a group should incline to the theory of Communism. But if Western countries persist in applying unjust pressure, they may well throw themselves into Russia’s arms.

The Algerines, in particular, would never acknowledge the flag of the United States, unless it were made for their interests to do so.

Neoconservatives believe that we can only be defined by having an enemy.

The Western Powers have shown themselves unable to understand that our vital interests must be satisfied; the Press of those countries has played its part, together with irresponsible and mischievous elements, and the Czechoslovak crisis arose.

Our foreign policy reflects the perceptions of our political elite about what we want.

In order to function, the United States needs an enemy.